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For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial
regulationsince the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there has been little
examination of the competing normative goals offinancial regulation.
Should the financialsystem be treatedas an end in itself such that the
efficiency of that system is the primary goal? Or should financial
regulation instead treat the financial system as a means to the end of
broader economic growth? This Article argues for the latter
approach, and stakes out the controversial normative position that
financial stability, rather than efficiency, should be the paramount
focus of financial regulation. Having fixed upon this normative
foundation, this Article is in a position to evaluate Dodd-Frank's
creation of the FinancialStability Oversight Council, a body intended
to bring the United States' financial regulators together for the
purpose of identiying and responding to threats to financial stability.
This Article argues that there are significantflaws in the FSOC's
structure and mandate that will limit its ability to discharge this vital
task. Whilst the FSOC is currently the subject of legislative reform
proposals, these proposals seek to hobble the FSOC's powers. This
Article argues that reform should instead swing in the other direction.
What is needed is an effective and independent regulator with the
resources and mandate to take a proactive, long-term, and creative

approach to the promotion offinancial stability. This Article therefore
explores potential reforms to the United States financial regulatory
architecture-rangingfrom the incremental to the more drastic and

designed to improve commitment to financialstability.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial regulation
since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (the Financial Crisis), there are some
fundamental matters that have been left largely untouched by the legal
scholarship. In particular, the tensions between the competing normative goals
1
that animate financial regulation have gone largely unexplored. This Article
wades into these waters, and considers whether financial regulators should
focus principally on the efficiency of the financial sector, or instead make
financial stability their paramount goal-reflecting a primary concern for the
broader economic growth that the financial sector facilitates (and harms). This
Article concludes that financial stability should take precedence over
efficiency in terms of regulatory goals, and an acceptance of this conclusion
begs another undertheorized question: Is the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (commonly known as the FSOC), established by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in order "to
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial
2
system," up to such a critical task? This Article thus looks in detail at the
FSOC's powers, structure, and mandate, in order to assess its potential to
actually mitigate threats to financial stability.
The United States' financial system is regulated by an alphabet soup of
different regulatory agencies, 3 and it became apparent during the Financial
I For a rare and thoughtful consideration of these normative themes, see generally
David A. Westbrook, Rethinking Financial Markets: A Conference from the WEA
Problematique, WORLD ECON. Ass'N (2012), http://rfconference2012.weaconferences.net/
problematiquel [http://perma.cc/34AG-KFZ2].
2
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § I 12(a)(1)(C), 12
U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)(C) (2012) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
3 For a list of these agencies, see infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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Crisis that none of these agencies saw "its job as protecting the economy and
financial system as a whole." 4 The FSOC was formed in 2010 as one response
to this problem 5 : it is a council populated by the heads of the various federal
financial regulatory agencies, 6 and directed to monitor and address threats to
financial stability.7 The FSOC was not particularly contentious at the time it
was first created, but it has become a political hot potato in the past few years,
with both the mutual fund and insurance industries seeking to challenge the
FSOC's authority to subject them to heightened regulatory scrutiny.8
Prompted by such controversy, several bills have been introduced that propose
to restructure the FSOC. 9 Unfortunately, the aim of such legislative reform is
to retrofit the FSOC in a way that creates a bias against proactive financial
stability regulation and increasingly politicizes the council.10 This Article
argues that while the FSOC should indeed be restructured, such restructuring
should move in the opposite direction and have the goal of making the FSOC a
more effective financial stability regulator, particularly by making it less
susceptible to the cycle of political economy.'I
Public attention to the importance of financial stability tends to be
cyclical-waxing during a crisis and waning as the economy starts to
recover. 12 As a result, regulators are likely to lack public support for their
efforts to promote financial stability unless the system is in crisis mode. 13 This
4 THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM,
A NEW
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2 (2009)

FOUNDATION:

[hereinafter OBAMA WHITE PAPER], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FinalReport web.pdf [http://perma.cc/KUR6-YQDK].
5"The broad membership of the council is intended to limit the tendency
of
regulators to focus narrowly on the institutions and markets within their jurisdictions while
overlooking risks from interdependencies that cut across jurisdictions." Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition,
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation 5 (May 5, 2011)
(transcript
available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke
20110505a.pdf [http://perma.cc/QE3W-57Q6]).
6 Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (b)(1).
7 § 112(a).
8
Specifically, these industries are seeking to challenge the FSOC's authority to
subject non-bank financial institutions to heightened levels of supervision by the Federal
Reserve. Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES
(May 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/201 4 /05/ 23 /business/the-financial-crisis-alreadyforgotten.html [http://perma.cc/2DTS-W35R]. For a discussion of the designation process,
see infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
9
See, e.g., S. 107, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 4387, 113th Cong. (2014).
10
See infra text accompanying notes 272-79.
11 See infra Part V.
12
John C. Coffee, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy ofDodd-Frank: Why FinancialReform
Tends to Be FrustratedandSystematic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 102021(2012).
13 Id
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can make it difficult for regulators to overcome concentrated efforts by the
financial industry to avoid and strip away the constraints of financial stability
regulation over time. However, the potentially grave consequences of financial
instability (and the social costs of ex post measures intended to mitigate its
fallout) militate against regulators ignoring financial stability issues until a
14
crisis occurs and the public cares about financial stability once more. The
FSOC, as the only regulatory body with a statutory direction to address threats
to financial stability, should therefore be designed in a way that insulates it as
much as possible from this political economy cycle. Unfortunately, both the
FSOC's structure and its mandate are flawed in ways that increase the
susceptibility of financial stability regulation to the vagaries of political
economy. 15
Given the uncertainty inherent in financial stability regulation, it is
important that regulators have a solid mandate that legitimizes, and affords
them some leeway with regard to, their attempts to preserve financial
stability. 16 While the FSOC's mandate does include "identify[ing] risks to the
financial stability of the United States" and "respond[ing] to emerging threats
7
to the stability of the United States financial system,"l because the term
"financial stability" is not defined in Dodd-Frank, the FSOC's mandate is less
robust than it could be. Certainly, there is a shared sense that we want to
prevent financial institutions from collapsing and causing damage to the
broader economy,18 but this "know-it-when-I-see-it" approach to financial
stability provides limited guidance to the FSOC, and this lack of definition
opens up the FSOC's actions to challenge by the financial industry (through
19
lobbying, capture, and judicial review).
14

See infra Part l1.
See infra Part IV.
Errors are unavoidable in a system as complex as the financial system, which is
characterized by Knightian uncertainty. Nonetheless, financial stability regulation is not
doomed to failure. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it:
15
16

Our continuing challenge is to make financial crises far less likely and, if they
happen, far less costly. The task is complicated by the reality that every financial
panic has its own unique features that depend on a particular historical context and the
details of the institutional setting. But .. . one can, by stripping away the idiosyncratic
aspects of individual crises, hope to reveal the common elements.. . . The challenge
for policymakers is to identify and isolate the common factors of crises, thereby
allowing us to prevent crises when possible and to respond effectively when not.
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Fourteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, The Crisis as a Classical Financial
Panic 8 (Nov. 8, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20131108a.htm [http://perma.cc/YF9S-7AHM]).
17
Dodd-Frank Act § 1 12(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1) (2012).
1
8 William A. Allen & Geoffrey Wood, Defining and Achieving FinancialStability, 2
J. FIN. STABILITY 152, 152-53 (2006).
19
See infra text accompanying notes 295-302.
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The key structural concern regarding the FSOC is that while it has been
given an express mandate to pursue financial stability, the agencies led by its
members have not: because the FSOC is a council rather than a body with
substantial staff of its own, if the financial regulatory agencies represented on
the FSOC are not concerned with financial stability issues, then a council of
those agencies is unlikely to be effective in pursuing financial stability. 20 This
Article concludes that, at present, these other federal financial regulatory
agencies (with the possible exception of the Federal Reserve) have only
nebulous responsibility for financial stability concerns, and this responsibility
is easily shirked when the economy is booming and regulatory intervention
has become unpalatable. 2 1 Unless there is a way to focus and maintain the
attention of these agencies on financial stability, the FSOC will be unable to
leverage their expertise, and its efficacy will be limited.
Although the Federal Reserve (which is one of the agencies represented on
the FSOC) 22 has shown an inclination to fill the breach and take de facto
responsibility for financial stability issues, this is not a uniformly positive
development. The Federal Reserve has a tendency to prefer bank-centric
approaches to regulation, 23 notwithstanding that the promotion of financial
stability requires a broad imagination about the types of shocks and
transmission mechanisms that can generate crises. 24 To be truly effective in
addressing threats to financial stability, the FSOC should benefit from the
different types of expertise of all of the federal financial regulatory agencies:
the Federal Reserve should not be dominant to the exclusion of all other
agencies. The dominance of the Treasury Secretary within the FSOC is cause
for concern for different reasons; as a Presidential appointee, the Treasury
Secretary has less independence from the political process than the other
FSOC members. 25 The prominence of the Treasury Secretary thus has the
potential to render the FSOC even more susceptible to the political economy
of the financial regulatory cycle than it would otherwise be. 2 6
20

See infra Part IV.A.3.
21 See infra Part IV.A.3.
22
Dodd-Frank Act § 11 1(b)(1)(B).
23
See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
24 In a letter to the Queen of England addressing her question
"why had nobody
noticed that the credit crunch was on its way?", the British Academy for the Humanities
and Social Sciences responded:
[T]he failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off,
while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of
many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to
the system as a whole.
Letter from Tim Besley, Professor, London Sch. of Econ., and Peter Hennessey, Professor,
Queen Mary Univ. of London, to Her Majesty The Queen 3 (July 22, 2009),
http://www.britac.ac.uk/events/archive/forum-economy.cfm [http://perma.cc/4JKZ-9YGA].
25
See infra Part IV.A.2.
26
See infra Part IV.A.2.
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This Article suggests a number of reforms intended to address the
concerns raised about the FSOC's structure and mandate. One far-reaching,
and potentially very effective, reform would be to consolidate prudential
supervision of all United States financial institutions into a single wellresourced prudential regulatory agency, and then abolish the FSOC.
Australia's successful experience with its Australian Prudential Regulatory
27
Authority could serve as a template for designing such an agency.
Recognizing, however, the intransigence of the United States' federal financial
regulatory architecture, this Article also explores a number of reforms
intended to work largely within the existing regulatory structure. These range
from requiring financial stability-related testimony and certifications from the
heads of each federal financial regulatory agency, to amending Dodd-Frank to
include a definition of "financial stability," to implementing a statutory
financial stability mandate for all of the federal financial agencies. Such a
mandate would be designed to mitigate the political economy of the financial
regulatory cycle by training regulatory attention on financial stability issues
even in normal and boom times, when the public is largely oblivious to such
issues. The mandate would also assist in fostering a regulatory identity that is
more impervious to capture, and permit regulators to develop broader, simpler,
rules that are better calculated to promote stability than rules that deal too
28
granularly with the minutiae of financial activities.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses why
financial stability regulation is so important, and makes the case for proactive
financial stability regulation, rather than simply letting instability develop and
then cleaning up after the fact. In particular, Part II tackles the normative
question of how we should balance the need for financial stability with the
desire for an efficient financial system. Part III provides an introduction to the
FSOC that provides context for the remainder of the Article. Part IV discusses
some of the operational difficulties the FSOC faces in pursuing its financial
stability mandate, highlighting the problems of member agency coordination
as well as the problematic dominance of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury.
It then moves on to consider the inconsistencies, ambiguities, and general lack
of clarity inherent in the mandate itself, particularly when it comes to the
threshold issue of what exactly we mean by "financial stability." Part V
responds to the concerns raised in Part IV by suggesting some reform options,
the most meaningful and radical of which involves the creation of a standalone prudential regulator with resources that befit the gravity of the task of
regulating for financial stability. Part VI concludes.

27
28

See infra notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION

A. The Social Costs ofFinancialInstability
When the financial system breaks down, there is usually a negative impact
on the price of financial assets: highly-leveraged financial institutions will
likely need to sell their assets quickly, which can depress asset prices systemwide, 29 and this can precipitate a lack of confidence that leads other investors
to seek an "early-mover advantage" by selling off their financial assets before
other investors do (in popular parlance, a "run"). 30 The financial system is the
primary provider of credit to the broader economy, and in this type of
environment, financial institutions tend to restrict lending. 3 1 From a
macroeconomic perspective, this is how the real harm occurs. When
businesses and local governments are no longer able to obtain credit through
the incapacitated financial system, it limits their ability to expand and prevents
broader economic growth. 32 This Article argues that the most pernicious
aspect of the Financial Crisis was not the harm that it inflicted on financial
assets and institutions, but the longer term slowdown of macroeconomic
growth that ensued. 33
The negative macroeconomic effects of the Financial Crisis have proved
more enduring than the hit to financial asset prices. Stock prices returned to

29

Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity
and Credit Crunch 20072008, 23 J. EcoN. PERSP. 77, 94 (2009).
30
1d. at 96.
31 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophyfor Financial
Stability Regulation, 45 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 173, 183 (2013).
32
Brunnermeier, supra note 29, at 90.
33 In many respects, this concern is similar to the concerns
expressed by Piketty in his
book Capital in the Twenty-First Century. To grossly oversimplify, Piketty's
thesis is that
the rate of return on capital ("r"-where capital is comprised of financial
and non-financial
assets) is likely to exceed the rate of economic growth ("g") in the twenty-first
century.

THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25-26 (Arthur
Goldhammer

trans., 2014). Those without significant amounts of accumulated capital derive
income
primarily from wages that remain stagnant or even shrink as economic growth
slows, and
thus wealth is concentrated in the hands of a very small group that has already
amassed
significant amounts of capital that is appreciating at a rate of return in excess
of what most
people can earn as wages. See id Piketty's chief recommendation to address
this dynamic
of widening inequality is the implementation of progressive taxes on capital.
Id at 471.
This Article does not purport to comment on the merits of such proposal,
nor does it
engage with Piketty's thesis about declining growth rates more generally.
Instead, it notes
that one of the key problems identified by Piketty-that inequality becomes
further
entrenched when r>g-is worsened by financial crises that exacerbate the
disparity
between r and g by suppressing broad-based economic growth. Id. So long as r>g,
"past
wealth naturally takes on disproportionate importance, because it takes only
a small flow of
new savings to increase the stock of wealth steadily and substantially." Id. at
25.
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-

regard to
their pre-Crisis heights by March of 2012,34 but the picture with
of the
majority
the
employment remained far less sanguine for far longer-and
on
than
livelihood
population is much more dependent on wages for their
10%
at
financial assets. 35 The unemployment rate in the United States peaked
17.4%),36
at
estimated
time
that
at
in October of 2009 (with underemployment
the
and although unemployment has been steadily declining since then, when
stock market recovered to pre-Crisis levels in March of 2012, the
unemployment rate was still 8.2%.37 Even as of May 2015, the unemployment
June of
rate was 5.5%-still much higher than the 4.6% rate that pertained in
2007.38 Furthermore, unemployment has remained particularly high among
39
African-Americans and Hispanics, as well as amongst young Americans
the skills and
leading to fears of a "lost generation" that may never develop
4 0 Even for those
experience necessary to establish long-term employment.
4 1 have
who are employed, wages (other than for superstars and CEOs)
the
remained largely stagnant-not just since the Financial Crisis, but since
the
that
then,
surprising,
bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001.42 It is not

Christine Hauser, NASDAQ Finishes Above 3,000, Its Best Since Dot-Com Bubble,
2
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 3012/03/14/business/stocks-rally-topre-2008-heights.html? r-0 [http://perma.cc/PJ4A-88S ].
in April of
35 According to Gallup's annual Economics and Personal Finance survey,
from
(down
market
2013 only 52% of all American adults had any investments in the stock
Low,
Record
at
Stays
a pre-Crisis high of 65%). See Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership
GALLUP (May 8, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record3
low.aspx [http://perma.cc/SBG2-PST ].
34

CRISIS INQUIRY
See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL
THE FINANCIAL
OF
CAUSES
THE
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
36

underemployment rate
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 390 (Jan. 2011). This
those who are too
and
employed
fully
be
to
prefer
would
includes part-time workers who
discouraged to look for work, in addition to those who are unemployed and actively
searching for work.
Bureau of Labor
37 All statistics relating to unemployment levels are drawn from the
BUREAU
Subject,
by
Calculators
&
Tables
Databases,
and Statistics. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
[http://perma.cc/XM8T-66KB].
14000000
OF LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS
38

Id.

J.L. & PUB.
David M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity, 35 HARV.
POL'Y 453, 456 (2012).
WASH. POST
40
Robert J. Samuelson, Is the Economy Creating a Lost Generation?,
(Dec. 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.comopinions/robert-samuelson-is-the-economy20
creating-a-lost-generation/ 12/12/09/41683956-4093-11 e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.html
[http://perma.cc/2EXY-2WDC].
surged.
41 Krugman notes that wage income for the very top earners in America has
2014),
8,
(May
BOOKS
REv.
N.Y.
Age,
Gilded
New
a
in
We're
Why
Krugman,
Paul
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/
[http://perma.cc/F82N-KE3N].
39

42

LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 5-6 (12th ed. 2012).
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Pew Research Center has found that:
[U]pper-income families have begun to regain some of the wealth they lost
during the Great Recession, while middle-income families haven't seen any
gains. The median wealth among upper-income families increased from
$595,300 in 2010 to $639,400 in 2013 (all dollar amounts in 2013 dollars).
The typical wealth of middle-income families was basically unchanged in
2013-it remained at about $96,500 over the same period. 43
It is important to note that not all of the consequences of the Financial
Crisis can be measured in percentages or dollar terms. Federal Reserve Chair
Janet Yellen has stressed that, when discussing unemployment, "[t]hese
are
not just statistics. . . . The toll is simply terrible on the mental and physical
health of workers, on their marriages, on their children." 44 Ronald A. Wilson,
the presiding judge of the municipal court of South Tucson, Arizona in
2009,
wrote a particularly poignant account of the impact of the Financial Crisis
on
society's most vulnerable:
[M]y position as presiding judge . .. provides me with ample opportunity to
observe the effects of the current economic crisis on indigent defendants who
appear before me. These people include single parents living with their small
children in cars, under bridges, in alleys, and in the desert; unemployed
people who have lost their homes; and homeless veterans suffering from
mental illness and co-occurring substance abuse problems. The worsening
economic conditions have significantly impacted this population. I have seen
an increase in petty misdemeanors and quality-of-life crimes....

... My shoplifters steal food, toilet paper, deodorant, diapers,
aspirin,
bug spray, bandages, batteries, flashlights, blankets, soap, and beer....
... Loitering, panhandling, criminal trespass, and failure to obey lawful
order citations have also increased....

43 In its analysis, the Pew Research Center refers to wealth
as "the difference between
the value of a family's assets (such as financial assets as well as home, car and businesses)

and debts." Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America's Wealth Gap Between
MiddleIncome and Upper-Income FamiliesIs Widest on Record, PEW
REs. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2014),

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/1 7 /wealth-gap-upper-middle-income/
[http://
perma.cc/C7C2-NWC3].
44 Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Remarks at
"A Trans-Atlantic Agenda for Shared Prosperity": A Conference Sponsored by the
AFLCIO, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, A Painfully
Slow Recovery for America's Workers: Causes, Implications, and the Federal Reserve's
Response 10 (Feb. 11, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/yellen20130211 a.pdf [http://perma.cc/68BV-527M]) (footnote omitted).
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Crimes related to substance abuse are also on the rise. As people lose
their jobs, their homes, and their livelihood, they often slip into depression.
Without health care, they often self-medicate with alcohol or other drugs in
order to cope with their feelings of failure, abandonment, loss, anger,
confusion, and betrayal. Too often the drugs and alcohol lead to driving under
the influence, domestic violence, possession of narcotic paraphernalia,
drinking in public, or disorderly conduct.
In addition to quality-of-life crimes, there are also several criminal traffic
and civil traffic offenses that are on the rise. Within a few weeks of
or
unemployment, many people fail to renew their car insurance
valid
a
without
driving
that
is
registration. ... What they fail to realize
registration or car insurance may result in significant fines and the suspension
of their driver's license.

. .

. If they are caught driving on a suspended license,

the vehicle that they are driving will be impounded and the driver will be
taken to jail. Often this is the only vehicle in the household....
When a person lives in an area that has poor public transportation, ... no
license and no car means no job. In addition, people in these areas will now
find it very difficult to get their children to day care, doctor's appointments,
45
or school.
Crisis
Research has also found deleterious consequences of the Financial
47
46
the
in matters as diverse as pro se litigation and reproduction rates, and

45 Ronald A. Wilson, The View from South Tucson: How the Economic Crisis Affects
Defendants in My Courtroom, 48 JUDGES' J. 14, 14, 34 (2009).
46
Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of FinancialHardship-A Legal
Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45 (2011).
47 Ross Douthat has noted:
Last
American fertility plunged with the stock market in 2008, and it hasn't recovered.

hit the lowest rate ever
week, the Pew Research Center reported that U.S. birthrates

.

rate
recorded in 2011, with just 63 births per 1,000 women of childbearing age. (The
was 71 per 1,000 in 1990.) . .

... American fertility plummeted during the Great Depression, and more recent
downturns have produced modest dips as well.
Ross Douthat, More Babies Please, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/1 /0 /opinion/sunday/douthat-the-birthrate-and-americas-future.html?_r-0 [http://
2

2

3
perma.cc/7LZ2-GSJ ].

A study from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research found that a
in some
period of stable to rising fertility rates across Europe came to a halt, and
countries reversed, after 2008.
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medical literature highlights some of the dangers that financial instability can
pose for health. For example, a Duke study considered the "potential relation
between U.S. stock market volatility and cardiovascular events" by looking at
whether there was a significant increase in the occurrence of heart attacks
during and immediately after the Financial Crisis.4 8 Particularly when looking
at the period from October 2008 to April 2009, the study found a statistically
significant increase in the number of acute myocardial infarctions. 49 Also
disturbing is a study that appeared in The Lancet regarding the suicide rate in
the United States following the Financial Crisis, which found that there were
an additional 1,580 suicide deaths per year in the years 2008-2010, when
compared to the suicide mortality rate in the years 1999-2007.5o With regard
to health more generally, one study concluded that because of financial
constraints, people suffering from medical problems were less likely to seek
medical assistance in the wake of the Financial Crisis. 5 1
This Part's survey of social costs is by necessity abbreviated, but even this
brief discussion makes clear that while the United States' economy may now
be rebounding, some of the damage inflicted by the Financial Crisis cannot be
undone. Furthermore, to the extent that recovery is possible, it has not been
consistent-the bulk of the ongoing social costs of the Financial Crisis are
being borne by the more economically vulnerable members of society.5 2 Even
a limited survey of the outcomes of the Financial Crisis thus makes a very
strong case for treating financial stability not just as "nice to have," but
something that should be proactively pursued by financial regulators.

The reversal was particularly acute in Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Croatia, and

Latvia, the study found. With the exception of Ireland, low fertility in each threatened

the ability of future governments to support growing numbers of the elderly, who
rely
on the next generation of taxpayers to provide their pensions.

Norma Cohen, Financial Hardship Drives Europe's Fertility Rate Down, FIN. TIMES
(July 11, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ib0fc39e-e982-1 le2-bf03-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz3jHUfbnXN [http://perma.cc/6B3T-HGEH].
48 Mona Fiuzat et al., United States Stock Market Performance
and Acute Myocardial
Infarction Rates in 2008-2009 (from the Duke Databankfor CardiovascularDisease),
106
AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1545, 1547 (2010).
49

50

Id.
Aaron Reeves et al., Increase in State Suicide Rates in the
USA During Economic

Recession, 380 LANCET 1813, 1813 (2012).

51 Annamaria Lusardi et al., The Economic Crisis and
Medical Care Use:
ComparativeEvidencefrom Five High-Income Countries, 96 Soc. Sci. Q. 202, 203 (2015).
52
Fry & Kochhar, supra note 43; see also ALDO CALIARI,
CTR. OF CONCERN,
AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: PART AND PARCEL OF A POST-2015

INEQUALITY

DEVELOPMENT AGENDA? (Oct. 2012), https://www.worldwewant2015.org/file/284057/
download/307928 [https://perma.cc/6P7G-EJQK].
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B. FinancialStability Regulation
In previous work, I have lamented the lack of attention paid to what is
meant by the term "financial stability": without a clearly defined goal,
financial stability regulation lacks legitimacy, and is likely to be implemented
inconsistently. 5 3 In order to clarify the meaning of the term, I have argued that
"financial stability" should be defined to reflect both technical notions about
the state of the financial system during periods of stability, and a value-based
assessment about the importance of the financial system as a means to broader
economic prosperity. 54 With regard to the former, the definition of financial
stability should emphasize that the mere absence of crisis does not denote
stability. A stable financial system is also able to "absorb (rather than amplify)
shocks"-no matter where they may arise (meaning that the focus of financial
stability regulation should be broader than just "too big to fail" financial
institutions).55 With regard to the social policy dimensions of financial
stability, if financial institutions and markets could fail without harming the
broader economy, then financial stability would not be such an important
public policy goal. Unfortunately, the externalities of such failures
of
(particularly the freezing up of credit) cause indirect harm to broad swathes
the economy, and so financial stability should be defined as a public good,
the financial system
something that must be nurtured even in good times when
56
does not appear to need any government intervention.
The aim of financial stability regulation should be to prevent the
externalization of the consequences of risks taken within the financial system
to
to people who are outside of the financial system (and who have not agreed
5 7 Historically, financial stability regulation has not had such a
bear such risks).
Hilary J. Allen, What Is "Financial Stability"? The Need for Some Common
935 (2014). For a
Language in InternationalFinancialRegulation, 45 GEO. J. INT'LL. 929,
53

working definition of "financial stability," see infra Part V.B.
54
In a similar vein, Rahman argues that financial reform should be informed by both
moral and technical reasoning:
also
The problem of financial reform is not merely one of technical policy design; it is
economy
a
good
what
about
judgments
a thickly moral problem that involves weighty
looks like, what kinds of financial transactions are socially valuable, and about how
we ought to distinguish, balance, and regulate these different kinds of activities.

.

K. Sabeel Rahman, Managerialism, Structuralism, and Moral Judgment: Law, Reform
Discourse, and the Pathologies of Financial Reform in Historical Perspective 4 (Nov. 2013)
(prepared for presentation at the Joint Program of the Financial Institutions and European
Law Sections, AALS Annual Meeting, New York City, January 3, 2014, for the panel
Comparative Perspectives on
"Taking Stock of Post-Crisis Reforms: Local, Global, and
3 6 2 92 [http://perma.cc/8PHM8
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2
Regulation"),
Sector
Financial
WXJT].
55
Allen, supra note 53, at 943-44.
56
Id. at 946-4 7
57
Allen, supra note 31, at 182.
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sweeping purview. Prior to the Financial Crisis, financial stability regulation
was decidedly microprudential in orientation in the sense that regulatory
attention was trained on individual financial institutions (primarily banks),
rather than on the system as a whole. 5 8 It was assumed that so long as
individual banks had sufficient buffers of loss-absorbing capital and were
prudently managed (in the regulatory lingo, were "safe and sound"), then the
financial system as a whole would be safe. 59 However, the Financial Crisis
shattered that assumption: in 2008, financial institutions (including non-banks)
started to sell off assets in fire sales in an attempt to protect their own safety
and soundness, but such fire sales depressed asset values and damaged
confidence system-wide, harming the ability of other institutions and markets
to function. 60 The Financial Crisis thus illustrated that an institution's attempts
to preserve its safety and soundness may come at the expense of the stability
of the financial system as a whole, and post-Crisis, regulators have come to
embrace the need to look beyond individual financial institutions and take a
more "macroprudential" approach to financial regulation. 6 1
A macroprudential approach dictates that financial stability regulation
should not restrict its focus to the safety and soundness of the system's key
component parts: financial regulators must also pay close attention to the
interactions and linkages between the financial institutions and markets that
constitute the financial system. 62 Since the Financial Crisis, proposals have
been made for new types of financial stability regulation that reflect this
systemic perspective, including a pre-approval process for new financial
products, 63 limitations on the size of financial institutions,64 and transaction
taxes. 65 At present, however, there is little political will to pursue such
measures. Instead, Dodd-Frank tends to mandate the use of more traditional
regulatory tools to promote financial stability, like activities restrictions (such
as the Volcker Rule), 66 leverage and capital requirements, 67 and clearing and

58 Samuel G. Hanson et al., A MacroprudentialApproach to Financial
Regulation, 25
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2011).
59
Id at 4-5.
60
See id at 5.
61 Bemanke, supranote 5, at 12.
62 Hanson et al., supra note 58, at 3.
63
Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex
Financial
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 66 (2012); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDAfor
FinancialInnovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century
FinancialMarkets, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 1307, 1309-10 (2013).
64
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 214-17 (2010).
65

For a discussion of Pigouvian taxes in the financial sector, see Douglas A.
Shackelford et al., Taxation and the FinancialSector, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 781 (2010).
66
Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
67
1d. § 171.
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disclosure requirements. 68 However, these traditional tools are being
approached for the first time from a macroprudential, as well as
microprudential, perspective. For example, leverage and capital requirements
are by no means new tools, but now regulators are considering deploying them
in a countercyclical way (i.e., using them to tamp down an incipient boom, and
69
to loosen restrictions in a slump). Constant monitoring of the entire financial

system, and the risks building up within it, is an essential precondition to
knowing when and how to deploy these traditional regulatory tools to
macroprudential ends-and indeed a precondition to financial stability
70
regulation more generally.
While financial stability regulation is an important undertaking, it is also a
difficult one, facing numerous challenges. The global nature of financial
institutions and markets dictates that financial stability regulation must be an
international endeavor, yet global agreement on financial stability regulation
can be hard to come by. 71 At both the international and the domestic level,
financial institutions tend to arbitrage financial stability regulation in a way
that can thwart its efficacy. 72 In addition, the complexity of the interconnected
actors and products that constitute the financial system can complicate
68 See, for example, id tit. 7, as it applies to clearing and disclosure requirements for
swaps.
69 For example "the regulator can lower leverage and/or credit-extension ceilings,
and/or boost reserve and/or capital buffer requirements, and/or raise liquidity minima
and/or lower maturity mismatch maxima during boom phases, while doing the contrary
during slump phases." Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional
9 VA. L.
'Safety and Soundness' to Systemic 'FinancialStability' in FinancialSupervision,
difficulties
the
on
literature
broad
a
is
there
Although
(2015).
225
201,
& Bus. REv.
inherent in diagnosing asset booms and bubbles, Gerding argues persuasively that we need
not fixate on figuring out precisely when asset values have diverged from fundamentals.
Instead, he suggests that policy be guided by:
in
[E]conomic research [that] does point to a list of warning signs that booming prices

asset markets may be unsustainable. These early warning alarms include more than

the
skyrocketing asset prices and ratios of prices to earnings. They also include
following:
* historically cheap credit (measured by, among other things, low interest rates and
a growing money supply);
higher leverage of households, financial institutions, and governments;
*
*

a surge of external capital flowing into a country (measured by trade or current

account balances); and
*

an influx of inexperienced investors into a market.
&

ERK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 47 (Nicholas Mercuro

Michael D. Kaplowitz eds., 2014) (footnotes omitted).
70 Robert C. Hockett, Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal
Considerations 14 (Oct. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract2340316 [http://perma.cc/ZB4U-B53X].
71 Allen, supra note 53, at 929-31.
72
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability ofFinancialFailure, 92 TEX. L. REv. 75, 100-01 (2013).
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financial stability regulation, 73 and political economy concerns can undermine
financial stability regulation. 74 These last two concerns are particularly salient
when considering how best to design financial regulatory architecture (the
focus of Parts IV and V of this Article), and so they are worthy of some further
elaboration here.
First, the complexity of the constantly evolving financial system ensures
that threats to financial stability do not always come from expected sources. 7 5
As such, regulators can never be overconfident about which parts of the
system may generate financial instability. 76 Caution against such
overconfidence is an important lesson from the Financial Crisis: before the
Financial Crisis, many believed that commercial banks were the only
institutions subject to maturity mismatch (meaning they used short-term
funding to acquire longer term assets), and therefore that commercial banks
were the only institutions that were vulnerable to the runs and panics that
could precipitate financial crises. 77 However, runs in the money market mutual
fund and repo markets during the Financial Crisis illustrated that susceptibility
to runs was not unique to commercial banks.7 8 Furthermore, events like the
"Flash Crash" that have occurred since the Financial Crisis suggest that future
instability might be generated by financial institution activities that have
nothing to do with maturity mismatch. 79 As such, financial stability regulators
must keep an open mind and an expansive view of the interconnections within
the financial system. 80
Turning to the political economy of financial stability regulation, recent
experience suggests that once a financial crisis develops, there will be

73 Allen, supra note 31, at 189-90.
74
For a fulsome discussion of the political economy of Dodd-Frank, see generally
Coffee, supra note 12.
75 Financial stability regulation is particularly concerned with "what happens in
lower-probability, higher-impact crisis circumstances (known as 'fat-tail' events), when
rational assumptions about the operation of [the financial system] are less likely to hold."
Allen, supra note 31, at 193 (footnote omitted).
76
See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 1569, 1574 (2014) (regarding the dangers of dismissing
"alternative potential sources of systemic risk because of the perceived lack of historical
precedents").
77

RICHARD ScoTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 57
(5th ed.

2013).

78

Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 2010

BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 267 (2010).
79

See infra text accompanying notes 226-28.
"[O]wing to the changing nature of the financial system, banks could no longer be
considered the unique source of systemic risk." Michael W. Taylor, The Road From "Twin
Peaks "-andthe Way Back, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 61, 85 (2009). Instead, regulators should be
looking for structural interconnections and vulnerabilities throughout the financial system.
Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 76, at 1575.
80
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81
sufficient political will to address it. However, when the financial system
appears to be performing well, the public and politicians tend to have little
82
(to the extent that the public is
appetite for financial stability regulation
paying any attention at all to financial stability regulation during normal times,
such regulation is liable to be interpreted as an encroachment on private
freedoms).83 The financial industry will be paying keen attention to financial
stability regulation at all times, however, and has consistently strong (and
reasonably uniform) incentives to lobby financial regulatory agencies to
diminish financial stability regulations that impose short-term costs on the
industry. 84 Such lobbying efforts can be difficult for regulators to resist in the
absence of public support.
The influence of the financial industry in times of societal apathy can also
be exerted in ways that are much less overt than lobbying. Cognitive capture is
a phenomenon that has been much discussed in the financial regulatory
sphere.85 This type of capture doesn't necessarily evince any venal corruption
of regulatory agencies-instead, merely by identifying with the financial
industry (perhaps because they share social networks, or because they admire
the industry's expertise), financial regulators sometimes take on the worldview
of that industry. 86 The risk of regulators doing so becomes particularly acute at
87
times when the public has no interest in financial regulatory matters.
Cognitive capture can also arise when the regulator is dependent on the
financial industry for its information: that information is often filtered through
88
When
the industry's perspective before the regulator even receives it.
"public
the
view
to
tend
regulators
financial
cognitive capture is at work,
interest" as being synonymous with the efficiency and short-term profitability
89
However, this type of regulatory
of the financial industry they regulate.

81 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 96. See generally Andrew Crockett, Why
Is FinancialStability a Goal ofPublic Policy?, in MAINTAINING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY: A SYMPosIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF

KANSAS CITY 7, 27 (1997); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense ofBailouts, 99 GEO. L. J. 435, 439
(2011).
82
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 96-98. Coffee notes that there is no
natural constituency for financial stability regulation that can counterbalance the political
power of financial institutions. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1031-32.
83
Jodi L. Short, The ParanoidStyle in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 671
(2012).
84
Coffee, supra note 12, at 1027.
85
See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the FinancialCrisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel

& David Moss eds., 2013).
Carpenter
86
1d. at 77.
87
John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capitaland the
Needfor RegulatoryStrategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 815 (2011).
88
Allen, supra note 31, at 199.
89
Willem H. Buiter, CentralBanks and FinancialCrises, in MAINTAINING STABILITY
IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE

BANK OF KANSAS CITY 495, 601-02 (2008).
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approach is anathema to financial stability regulation, which requires a longterm perspective that prioritizes the interests of those outside of the financial
industry.
The political economy cycle thus creates enormous challenges for any
regulatory body charged with promoting financial stability, particularly
because it is almost impossible to demonstrate when financial stability
regulation is making a difference within such a complex system-"[h]ow can
a regulatory agency show that a financial crisis would have occurred butfor its
efforts?" 90 Furthermore, given the complexity and unpredictability of the
financial system, regulatory errors are inevitable 9 1-but financial stability
regulation can also succeed (particularly when it is designed to reduce the
complexity of the financial system). 92 If government agencies abdicate their
power over the financial system, such power will not dissipate but will accrue
to private actors. 93 As Pistor phrased it, lack of governmental regulation of
financial markets "signifies not the absence of regulation, but the implicit
delegation of rule making to different, typically non-state actors," 94 and the
non-state actors that tend to fill the power vacuum in the financial sphere tend
to be financial institutions with neither the ability, nor the inclination, to
address the endogenous risks that destabilize the financial system and cause
externalities for the world beyond the financial sector. 95 Financial regulators,
and financial stability regulation, are thus critical to protecting society's longterm interest in financial stability.
C. The Inadequaciesof a Purely Ex Post-FocusedApproach to
FinancialStability Regulation
It can be tempting for regulators to eschew unpopular financial stability
regulation when the economy is booming, knowing that if and when a crisis
occurs, there is likely to be overwhelming political support for remedial

90

Allen, supra note 31, at 190.

&

91 McDonnell and Schwarcz cite the capital adequacy standards set forth in Basel II as
an example of "deeply considered and deliberate decisions guided by the most
sophisticated understandings of the economy" that still went wrong. Brett McDonnell
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1629, 1641 (2011).
Regulations can also be destabilizing to the extent that they encourage uniformity and thus
heighten procyclicality and correlation of risks. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see
generally Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 323

(2011).
92

See infra text accompanying notes 124-30.

93 Short, supra note 83, at 680 (citation omitted).
94
Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory ofFinance,41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 321 (2013).

95 "Systemic risk regulation is an example where regulators cannot look to private
regulatory strategies. Regulators cannot expect that private actors will be capable of
identifying how the actions of individual firms may make the financial system less stable."
Eric J. Pan, UnderstandingFinancialRegulation, 4 UTAH L. REv. 1897, 1941 (2012).
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measures. 96 However, these ex post emergency measures can be limited in
their efficacy, as well as generate their own social costs. A purely ex post
97
approach to financial stability regulation is thus undesirable. To illustrate
this point, this Part will briefly explore and analyze the different types of ex
post measures available. To be clear, despite evincing a preference for
proactive measures to promote financial stability, this Article is not rejecting
ex post measures outright. Proactive regulations will never do a perfect job of
maintaining financial stability, and some form of the ex post mitigative
98
interventions discussed below may still be necessary (although care is
required to ensure that, in accepting the potential need for ex post measures,
we do not institutionalize fatalism about financial crises, or discourage the
refinement of ex ante measures). The aim of proactive financial stability
regulation is to minimize the need for the following types of ex post
interventions.
Central banks (like the Federal Reserve) are often the "first responders" to
financial crises-they tend to be very accommodating in their monetary policy
during and in the aftermath of a crisis, lowering interest rates to encourage
borrowing and spending. 99 Central banks can also attempt to lubricate the
financial system in ways that cannot be strictly characterized as monetary
policy, but lie in a hazy area somewhere in-between monetary policy, market
participation, and regulation.10 0 These functions include acting as lender of
last resort (i.e., lending to banks when no other source of liquidity is
available)101 or, as we saw during the last Financial Crisis, acting as marketmaker of last resort (i.e., buying assets to create liquidity when there is no
other buyer).1 02 Unfortunately, these policies (even if necessary) have social
costs: extended periods of low interest rates in the wake of the Financial Crisis
have made it difficult for senior citizens and others to live off their savings,
which has increased demand for riskier assets with higher yields, making the

96

Levitin, supra note 81, at 439.

97 Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 13,

24 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
98
"[E]ven the most rigorously constructed ex ante regulatory measures cannot
prevent the financial system from experiencing periodic crises." Anabtawi & Schwarcz,
supra note 72, at 96.
99 Monetary policy is formulated and implemented by central banks, and is primarily
effected by way of asset purchases and the setting of interest rates. What is the Difference
Between Monetary Policy and FiscalPolicy, and How Are They Related?, BD. GOVERNORS
FED. RES. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12855.htm [http://perma.cc/
P8WR-9H65] (last updated Oct. 30, 2014).
100 Rosa M. Lastra, Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability, 18
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 49, 59 (2010).

1 0 1 Id. at 61.
102 Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private" Means to "Public" Ends:
Governments as Market Actors 6-7 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper
444
[http://perma.cc/8AWC-ES2Y].
No. 13-84, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2222
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populace more susceptible to financial fraud 03 and increasingly questionable
securities investments. 104 Financial institutions are also searching for higher
yields in this prolonged low-interest rate environment, and have started
making funds available to corporations on riskier terms,105 potentially sowing
the seeds for future instability.1 06 Future instability may also result from
expectations that the Federal Reserve will intervene as a lender of last resort
(or market-maker of last resort), just as it has in the past: such expectations
encourage financial institutions to take outsized risks that they would never
have taken without the implicit promise of support in the event of failure. 0 7 In
addition to these side-effects of ex post central bank intervention, there are
also questions about its efficacy. The ability of monetary policy to stimulate
growth is the subject of hot debate at present, 0 8 with many arguing that there
is only so much that central banks can achieve in the wake of a serious
crisis. 109

Instability tends to generate political pressure for elected governments to
intervene as well. Assuming that a government reacts to this pressure (and it

103

Nathanial Popper, Speculative Bets Prove Risky as Savers Chase Payoff
N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/1 1/business/wave-of-investorfraud-extends-to-ordinary-retirement-savers.html?_r-0 [http://perma.cc/36CM-5NWK].
104 Kevin Roose, The Age of Bullshit Investments Is Back,
NYMAG.COM (Oct. 23,
2013), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/201 3 /10/crazy-investment-time-again.html [http://
perma.cc/H8NC-V8KV].
105 "[M]y reading of the evidence is that we are seeing a fairly significant pattern of
reaching-for-yield behavior emerging in corporate credit." Jeremy C. Stein, Governor, Fed.
Reserve Bank, Speech at the "Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great
Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter" Research Symposium, Overheating in
Credit Markets: Origin, Measurement, and Policy Responses (Feb. 7, 2013)
(transcript
available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein2013
0207a.htm [http://perma.cc/MU7G-FMJP]). Of particular concern is the leveraged loan
market. Mark Gongloff, Credit Bubble Comeback: Feds Warn of Dangers in Leveraged
Loan Market, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2013/
03/22/credit-bubble-leveraged-loan n_2932421.html [http://perma.cc/B9TC-HUWC].
106
William R. White, Should Monetary Policy "Lean or Clean"? 10 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Dali. Globalization and Monetary Pol'y Inst., Working Paper No. 34, 2009),
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2009/0034.pdf [http://perna.cc/
GDG4-UVJJ].
107 This is often referred to as "moral hazard." Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and
Ethics ofFinancialRisk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1209, 1210-11 (2011).
108 In 2013, the exclusive and influential Economic Policy Symposium in Jackson
Hole was devoted to the "Global Dimensions of Unconventional Monetary Policy." Global
Dimensions of Unconventional Monetary Policy, FED. RESERVE BANK KAN. CiTY (Aug.
22-24, 2013), https://www.kansascityfed.org/publications/research/escp/symposiums/escp2013 [https://perma.cc/ZFG5-U4NR]. This is a testament to the status of the efficacy of
monetary policy as a "hot topic."
109 White, supra note 106, at 9.
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11
may not,110 with governmental inaction exacerbating the crisis at hand),'
governmental crisis management can take the form of bailing out systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) 1 12 (with attendant moral hazard), as
well as the deployment of emergency fiscal policy options. While there are
many different ways in which a government can decide to tax and spend postcrisis, broadly speaking, there are two types of fiscal policy options available.
First, the government can attempt to stimulate demand by tax cuts, spending,
or both (the Keynesian option).11 3 Alternatively, it can try to encourage private
spending by cutting back on government spending: referred to as the austerity
option, the expectation here is that fiscal discipline by the government will
inspire confidence about the state's long-term viability and encourage private
investment. 114 Either option entails social costs: while stimulus is intended to
create demand and jumpstart the economy in the short-term (and thus
ameliorate the immediate pain occasioned by financial crises), the stimulus
will increase the public deficit.1 15 Over time, increasing public debt can
undermine a government's ability to borrow, potentially compromising the
1 16 In contrast, austerity
government's ability to fund future activities.
programs impose social costs in the short-term by cutting back on government
spending immediately.11 7 Although this Article will not weigh into the very
110

Katharina Pistor commented:

When staring into the abyss of a financial collapse, politicians like bureaucrats may
opt for rescue rather than self-destruction. As the showdown over the bailout package
in the U.S. in September 2008 (when Congress voted down the first version of the
law) has shown, however, this is by no means a foregone conclusion.
Pistor, supra note 94, at 328.
1ll Lack of government action can be costly: "[W]hen dealing with markets, gradual
action may be counterproductive because there is a specter of something bad, like
bankruptcy, nationalization, or other types of asset sales, happening at the end. This
uncertainty breeds inaction and might make the problem much worse." Phillip Swagel, The
FinancialCrisis: An Inside View, 2009 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 75 (2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Spring-2009/2009a.bpea _swagel.PDF
[http://perma.cc/996P-ZA8C]. "[T]he costs of the failure of intervention are typically on an
order of magnitude greater than the costs of the interventions themselves." Stiglitz, supra
note 97, at 14.
112For example, the U.S. Government invested $431 billion in banks pursuant to the
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) program. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM-MAR. 2012, at 1 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/

default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/03-28-2012TARP.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WX5B-V2DU].
113 Schizer, supra note 39, at 461.
114
Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM.
EcoN. REv. 573, 577-78 (2010).
115 Schizer, supra note 39, at 467.
116Id. at 467-68.
117
See, e.g., Liz Alderman, In Ireland, Austerity Is Praised but Painful, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/business/global/despite-praise-for-itsausterity-ireland-and-its-people-are-being-battered.html [http://perma.cc/4MAE-KVFT];
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active debate about austerity versus stimulus, 1 18 these two types of policies are

mentioned here to illustrate that ex post fiscal remedies (whether Keynesian or
austere) always impose costs on society.
Traditionally, financial regulatory agencies have tended to play less of a
role than central banks and governments in immediate crisis response. While
regulation will often be retooled to reflect the lessons of a crisis, this usually
takes time and does little to ease the constraints on the availability of credit
that characterize the immediate aftermath of financial crises. 119 However, if
countercyclical regulation is broadly implemented, agencies like the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) will be expected to play a much more active role in crisis
management by making the rules that govern financial institutions much more
permissive in bust times.1 2 0 Whilst countercyclical regulation does hold
promise in terms of enabling regulators to ease restrictions on credit
availability in the wake of a crisis, it also entails making regulation more
demanding in boom times;1 2 1 countercyclical regulation does not work as a
purely ex post response. As such, regulators will also need to focus on
financial stability issues even when the economy seems to be functioning well.
D. Complexity and Efficiency: PotentialProblems with a Proactive
Approach to FinancialInstability
Of course, a proactive approach to financial stability regulation is not
costless. One concern is that the regulations themselves are new "inputs" into
the financial system, and that the more inputs we add, the more complex-and
less stable-the financial system will be.' 2 2 Furthermore, new regulation often
inspires the creation of new products and institutions developed to arbitrage
those regulatory requirements, further compounding the complexity of the
financial system.1 23 However, this is not an inevitable result: if designed well,
Liz Alderman, More Children in Greece Are Going Hungry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/1 8 /world/europe/more-children-in-greece-start-to-gohungry.html [http://perma.cc/X3SK-PQR3]; Suzanne Daley, Fiscal Crisis Takes Toll on
Health of Greeks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/
world/europe/greeks-reeling-from-health-care-cutbacks.html [https://perma.cc/3T47-UEPS];
Raphael Minder, Education Cuts Met with Strike in Spain, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 2 /05/ 23 /world/europe/education-and-health-care-cuts-met-withstrike-in-spain.html [http://perma.cc/R9XZ-VU5Q].
118 See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, A Keynesian Victory, but Austerity Stands Firm, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/business/despite-keynesiansvictory-economic-policy-holds.html [https://perma.ccNB3K-QDTN].
119See
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 211-12.
120
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
121 Hockett, supra note 69, at 227.
1 22 For a discussion of the destabilizing effects of complexity, see generally Hilary J.
Allen, The PathologiesofBanking Business As Usual, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 861 (2015).
123 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 100-01.
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ex ante financial stability regulation can instead mitigate the financial system's
24 One way to limit arbitrage and its attendant
spiral into complexity.1
complexity would be for the regulatory "burden of proof' to be shifted to the
financial industry, so that industry participants would be required to
demonstrate why they should be allowed to create new products and engage in
new activities, instead of the regulators being forced to play an underresourced game of catch-up with the industry.1 25 As I have argued previously,
such an approach is well-calibrated to minimize the number of new inputs into
the financial system. 126 Other scholars have argued that complexity could be
27
reduced by breaking up "too big to fail" banks.1 Unfortunately, both of the
aforementioned approaches are likely to face (at least at present)
insurmountable opposition from the financial industry. There are, however,
other-potentially more politically feasible-regulatory approaches that can
limit the increase of complexity. In particular, favoring broad and simple
regulations over detailed and complex ones can be particularly useful in
28
promoting financial stability.1 Not only are broad and simple rules more
difficult to arbitrage, they are also more appropriate because they are "robust
29
to [the] ignorance" inherent in complex and uncertain systems1 -that is, they
are not tailored in too detailed a way to reflect the lessons of past experience
30
(which are often not a predictor of future crises).1 In sum, while ex ante
financial stability regulations can result in increased complexity and attendant
compromised stability, they can also be designed to avoid or minimize this
eventuality.
Others have argued against a proactive approach to financial stability
regulation on the grounds that "pursuing ex ante regulation as the only, or even
primary, regulatory strategy aimed at controlling systemic risk would be

124

It is also naive to suggest that complexity would not deepen in the absence of
regulation: exceedingly complex over-the-counter derivatives developed in the largely
unregulated space carved out by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.
Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82
U. CoLo. L. REv. 167 (2011).
125 Allen, supra note 31, at 179.
126Id at 222.
127 See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 64, at 214-17.
128
By way of example, Haldane and Madouros have suggested the following ways in
which capital adequacy requirements might be simplified: removing internal risk-based
models from the Basel capital adequacy architecture; increasing (and relying more heavily)
on a simple leverage ratio; and allowing more scope for regulatory discretion. Andrew G.
Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Vasileios Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's 36th Economic Policy Symposium:
The Changing Policy Landscape, The Dog and the Frisbee 14-172 (Aug. 31, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/ 012/ah.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AA5A-8KBH]).
129Id. at 3.
I30 Id. at 4.
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inefficient."l31 However, directing regulators to prioritize efficiency lends
credence to those who seek less-regulated capital flows, even at the expense of
financial stability. This Article argues, to the contrary, that regulators need a
clear direction that the primary normative goal of financial regulatory policy is
the ex ante pursuit of financial stability. Whilst efficiency is a relevant
concern, it is of lesser importance than financial stability.1 32
Any analysis of the relative importance of financial stability and efficiency
as goals for financial regulation raises the threshold issue of what is meant by
"efficiency." 33 Efficiency, as a normative goal of
regulation, is usually
interpreted to mean optimal allocative efficiency,1 34 in the Kaldor-Hicksian
sense that "the aggregate economic benefits exceed the aggregate economic
costs, even though some market participants may bear costs on net while
others reap benefits on net."1 35 On its face, allocative efficiency may seem like
an appropriate end goal for regulation of the financial system (after all, the
system exists largely for the purpose of allocating capital resources and
risk).1 36 However, a Kaldor-Hicksian analysis of the financial system fails to
consider distributional inequalities within that system1 37 : many of the capital
resources distributed are recycled amongst financial institutions in what
Lothian has termed "financial hypertrophy," whereas lesser amounts of capital

131 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supranote
72, at 102.
132 "Things happen during a speculative bubble
that can ruin people's lives. Little will
be done to stop these things if public figures consider themselves beholden
to some
overarching efficient markets principle." ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE
212 (2d ed. 2005). In a similar vein, Driesen has argued that the avoidance of systemic
risk
(while still allowing for economic growth) is "both more meaningful and more
achievable
than the goal of economic efficiency." David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons
from the
Financial
Crisis, 40 J. CORP. L. 55, 91 (2014).
133
"A major problem with the debates on efficiency
in markets and capital market
policy has been the lack of a clear efficiency rationale." Gill North & Ross
P. Buckley, A
Fundamental Re-Examination of Efficiency in Capital Markets in Light of
the Global
FinancialCrisis, 33 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 714, 741 (2010).
13 4
DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMicS
OF LAW 20 (2012); Anabtawi

&

Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 90; Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 14.
1 35 Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterionfor
Securities Regulation: Investor
Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIz. L. REV. 85, 87 (2015).
136 Financial market theory in the decades preceding
the Financial Crisis was premised
on the assumption that allocative efficiency enabled "providers and users
of funds more
effectively to meet their preferences for risk, return and liquidity." FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
THE
TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY REsPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING
CRISIs 40 (Mar.

2009) [hereinafter THE TURNER REVIEW], http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner
review.pdf [http://perma.cc/BY3G-8LWK].
137 Lee, supra note 135, at 87. For similar reasons,
Kaplow and Shavell reject wealth
maximization and efficiency criteria as the sole criteria for assessing rules to
the extent that
they omit "important aspects of individuals' well-being" and ignore distributive
concerns.
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 968
(2001).
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138 If
flow to more productive uses by households and non-financial businesses.
the financial system exists to promote broad-based economic growth, and not
matters. 139
just capital appreciation, then the way that capital is distributed
Furthermore, the concentration of resources within the financial system is
markets
problematic for financial stability because "the very size of financial
able to
or
willing
thus created pushes the limits of what sovereigns are
of crisis. 140
provide," in terms of backing and emergency support in times
However, according to the Kaldor-Hicks model, there is no problem with this
41
type of capital allocation.1
The criterion of efficiency has also been criticized as an ineffectual
standard for evaluating something as complex as financial stability regulation.
Driesen, for example, argues that financial regulation does not control the
allocation of capital, but instead creates a framework within which capital is
allocated.1 42 Although the regulatory framework certainly influences capital
allocation, there are many other variables-outside of the control of
of
regulation-that also influence capital allocation. Because the influence
optimal
these different variables cannot be isolated, Driesen argues that
allocative efficiency is not a yardstick by which financial regulation can be
measured.1 4 3 Furthermore, when regulation is assessed to determine whether it
form of
promotes efficiency, such assessment usually involves some

1 38 Lothian has described "financial hypertrophy" as the "expansion of the financial
that it
sector (measured by the proportion of talent, as well as resources and profits
Lothian,
absorbs) without regard to the service extended to the real economy." Tamara
"Law and
American Finance and American Democracy: Towards an Institutionalist
No. 418,
Paper
Working
Series,
Paper
Working
Sch.
Economics," 7-8 (Columbia Law
[http://perma.cc/5H43-8B8L].
2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-1996653
139
Lothian contrasts financial hypertrophy with financial deepening:
to the
By financial deepening, I mean the increase of the service that finance renders
financial
By
expansion of productive output and the enhancement of productivity.
a proportion
hypertrophy, I mean the expansion of the size of the financial industry, as
corresponding
a
without
talent,
for
magnet
a
as
well
of national income or profits as
of
reinforcement of support for the expansion of output and the enhancement
therefore
is
it,
use
to
productivity. The concept of financial hypertrophy, as I propose
parasitic on the concept of financial deepening. Financial hypertrophy is the expansion
of finance without financial deepening.
Id.

1 40 Pistor, supra note 94, at 323.
141 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 14. Black notes that the use of such economic models to
how the
assess the financial system is not merely a passive evaluation, but also drives
to the
Economic
the
system functions. Julia Black, Reconceiving FinancialMarkets-From
capital
to
insensitive
is
that
model
a
Using
Social, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 401, 432 (2013).
distribution will exacerbate any tendency of the financial system to work in a similarly
insensitive way. Id. at 435.
142 Driesen, supra note 132, at 56.
143 Id.
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quantified cost-benefit analysis.1 44 Unfortunately, quantified cost-benefit
analysis is ill-suited to assessing financial stability regulation for a number of
reasons. First, it gives us little guidance as to the stakeholders that should be
considered in the analysisl 4 5: when trying to assess costs and benefits, should
we consider only the financial institutions that populate the financial system
(and their counterparties), or should regulation also be concerned with those
who suffer from externalities generated by those financial institutions? Even if
it were accepted that cost-benefit analysis should consider the benefits to the
latter type of stakeholders, it is very difficult to quantify the social benefits of
avoiding instability, 146 and to show that instability would have occurred but
for the regulatory intervention.1 47 It is much easier to assign a dollar value to
industry compliance costs, and so a paramount focus on efficiency and costbenefit analysis is likely to favor the absence of financial stability
regulation, 148 even when such a deregulatory approach is likely to entail large
social costs. When dealing with the broad social costs of financial crises and
how they are distributed, cost-benefit analysis is therefore an inapt tool. 149
Of course, "efficiency" need not be defined solely in reference to optimal
allocative efficiency, and quantified cost-benefit analysis need not be the only
tool used to evaluate financial regulation. If "inefficiency" were
conceptualized as including any situation where financial institutions generate
externalities that negatively impact the broader economy (including in ways
that are difficult-if not impossible-to quantify), then "inefficiency" and
"financial instability" would describe largely the same state of affairs. This
Part could then be accused of setting up a false dichotomy between stability
and efficiency. However, efficiency is not usually conceived of in so broad a
fashion. 5 0 Instead, regulation promoting efficiency tends to neglect the
144 "[Q]uantified CBA in its ideal form-which some of its advocates
'complete' quantified CBA--entails specification and quantification of all refer to as
benefits and
costs in a single, uniform bottom-line metric (typically, dollars) representing the net

welfare effects of a proposed rule." John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 893 (2015) (footnote

omitted) (citing Letter from Nancy Nord et al. to Thomas R. Carper, Chair of the Senate
Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comm., and Thomas A. Coburn, Ranking Member
of the Senate Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comm.
2 (June 18, 2013),
http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File-id=8eb0dbd9-5631-4878-bfb2e04O4O7cf0ba [http://perma.cc/BB9B-HER8]).
14 5 Lee, supra note 135, at 117-18.
14 6
"[F]inancial products affect nearly every activity of
all citizens on a daily basis,"
which further complicates any attempt to capture the overall effect of regulation. 1d.
at 107.
147 Allen, supra note 31, at 190-91.
4
8
Id
149 Lee asserts that cost-benefit analysis is inapt for assessing
distributional concerns.

1

Lee, supra note 135, at 102.
150North & Buckley, supra note 133, at 716. Anabtawi
and Schwarcz also note that
the social costs of financial instability are sometimes conceived of as being "encompassed
under a broad view of economic efficiency," but then go on to say that "they are sometimes

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

1112

[Vol. 76:5

externalities of financial system failure that are imposed on persons outside of
the financial system, 15 1 who are nonetheless affected by the movements of the
broader economy (such as "laborers whose jobs would be lost" when
52 It also neglects the
economic growth stalls after a financial crisis).1
who do
disproportionate externalities of an economic downturn borne by those
way
uncomplicated
participate in the financial system, but only in a minor,
by
eviscerated
(for example, "pension holders whose pension funds would be
5 3 Although many believed prior to the Financial
excessive risk taking").'
Crisis that the financial system was efficiently allocating risk to those within
the system who were most willing to bear it, in fact much of that risk was
154
being externalized outside of the financial system to the broader economy,
with disastrous social consequences.
As such, financial regulation should be primarily informed by a normative
goal that is more inclusive than optimal allocative efficiency, and that
promotes general societal well-being in a way that is somewhat sensitive to
55
distributional inequalities.1 An acceptance of this normative position is often
implicit in ex post responses to financial crises, when efficiency concerns tend
to be abandoned in favor of interventionist policies that seek to promote social
welfare. 156 As Lothian has noted, the current state of affairs is that
if the
"[e]verything happens, in the realm of ideas and of public debate as
the
and
times
normal
of
economics
the
were
market fundamentalist view
157 However, as this
Keynsian view, the economics of crises and recession."
Part has already explored, by the time a crisis erupts, it is too late to avoid
many of the negative externalities caused by financial instability. The
supra note
regarded as implicating non-efficiency considerations." Anabtawi & Schwarcz,
72, at 90.
151 As Schwarcz puts it, "Even though systemic risk is a form of financial risk, it
stands apart and should be differentiated from traditional financial risk. Traditional
be the
financial risk focuses on risks within the financial system, and so efficiency should
Stephen
system."
financial
the
to
risks
on
focuses
risk
systemic
central goal. Conversely,
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207 (2008).
152 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 20.
153Id.
1 54

THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 136, at 42.

155 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 15. In a similar vein, Driesen notes, "This efficiency
focus remains predominant even though scholars have cast doubt on allocative efficiency's
normative value." Driesen, supra note 132, at 62.
156 As to the lack of cost-benefit rationale offered for bailouts in 2008, see Driesen,
(SEC)
supra note 132, at 92. Similarly, when the Securities and Exchange Commission
wake of the
temporarily banned all short selling of stock in financial institutions in the
Lehman Brothers collapse, there was no mention of cost-benefit analysis (or indeed, of
costs at all). See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 73 Fed. Reg.
55,169 (Sept. 18, 2008).
157
Tamara Lothian, Beyond Macro-PrudentialRegulation: Three Ways of Thinking
About Financial Crisis, Regulation and Reform 12 (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 411, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract-1961369 [http://perma.cc/96EE-9WZ5].
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acceptance of financial stability as the chief normative goal of regulation needs
to exist in good times as well as bad.
All of this is not to say that regulation should ignore efficiency concerns
entirely. Efficient markets allow "providers and users of funds more
effectively to meet their preferences for risk, return and liquidity," and in
circumstances where the normative goals of efficiency and financial stability
are compatible, regulation should aim to promote efficiency.1 5 8 However, the
pursuit of efficiency (especially in the short-term) will often be detrimental to
financial stability, and vice versa. 159 In these instances, financial regulators
will need to decide to what extent either efficiency or stability should be
sacrificed, and while regulators should not be so precautionary that they ban
any activity that could potentially harm financial stability, financial regulators
need to have a clear hierarchy of priorities that instructs them to err on the side
of protecting the smooth functioning of the financial system.1 60
At present,
however, only one of the many financial regulatory agencies in the United
States is charged with a statutory mandate to pursue financial stability as its
paramount goal: the FSOC. The next Part provides an introduction to this new
agency, before Part IV considers whether it is up to its vitally important task.
III. MEET THE FSOC
Instead of rationalizing the byzantine structure of the United States'
financial regulatory agencies, or giving any of these existing agencies a
financial stability mandate,161 the Dodd-Frank legislation enacted in 2010
created a council of the heads of various existing agenciesl62 named the
"Financial Stability Oversight Council," 63 and bestowed on that council alone
an express statutory mandate to promote financial stability.164 In the five years
1 5 8 THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note
136, at 40.
159

For example, new financial products that seek to improve
efficiency by providing
ever more bespoke methods of allocating risk and creating liquidity can create destabilizing
complexity. "It is for instance arguable that the allocative efficiency benefits of the creation
of markets for many complex structured [products] (e.g., CDO-squareds) would have been
at most trivial even if they had not played a role in creating financial instability." Id. at
41.
160 Allen, supra note 31, at 204.
161 Who Is Too Big to Fail? GAO's Assessment of the
FinancialStability Oversight
Council and the Office of FinancialResearch: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight
& Investigations of the H Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 65-88 (2013) (statement
of
A. Nicole Clowers, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) [hereinafter
Clowers Statement].
162 The FSOC also has an independent member with insurance expertise, who does
not
represent any federal agency. Dodd-Frank Act § I ll(b)(1)(j), 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
63
1 Id. § 111.
1 64 Id. § 112(a). "The Financial Stability Oversight
Council has a clear statutory
mandate that creates for the first time collective accountability for identifying risks
and
responding to emerging threats to financial stability." Fin. Stability Oversight
Council,
About
FSOC:
Frequently Asked
Questions,
U.S.
DEP'T
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
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since it was created, surprisingly little academic attention has been paid to the
FSOC's mandate, or to how it will or should carry out its functions (other than
65
the current furor over its designation powers).1 Furthermore, there has been
the
almost no discussion of how inserting a new administrative body into
166 This
apparatus.
regulatory
existing
the
financial regulatory mix will impact
Part will provide an introduction to the FSOC that will allow the rest of this
Article to engage in a more fulsome discussion of these issues.
The FSOC is a council of the officials who lead the federal financial
regulatory agencies. Each of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the
the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairperson of the FDIC, the Director of
the
SEC,
the
of
Chairman
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the
the
(CFTC),
Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
the
of
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Chairman
National Credit Union Administration Board is a voting member of the FSOC,
with the
as is "an independent member appointed by the President, by1 6and
7 The FSOC
expertise."
insurance
advice and consent of the Senate, having
also has five non-voting members: the Director of the Office of Financial
Research, the Director of the Federal Insurance Office, and representative state
68 Finally, the Treasury
banking, insurance and securities commissioners.1
69
Secretary is a voting member, and also acts as the Chair of the FSOC.1
Although the FSOC's members (and the agencies they lead) have not been
individually charged with express financial stability mandates, pursuant to
section 112(b) of Dodd-Frank, each voting member is required to submit an
annual statement to Congress outlining its views on extant threats to financial
stability.
bodies
The FSOC is distinguishable from the more substantial regulatory
170 and a
staff,
dedicated
small
a
led by its members because it has only

22
fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/29UM-3F ] (last updated May 19, 2015)
FSOC FAQs].
[hereinafter
16 5
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
166 This is an important question because, inevitably, "the organization of the
administrative system affects the substance of regulation." Keith Bradley, The Design of
Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 748 (2011).
167 Dodd-Frank Act § 11 1(b)(1).
1 6 8 Id. § 111(b)(2).
1 69 Id. § I11(b)(1).
170
As of June 2012, there were twenty-five staff in the "dedicated policy office within
Secretariat."
the Treasury's Office of Domestic Finance . .. which functions as the FSOC

NEW COUNCIL
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-886, FINANCIAL STABILITY:
TRANSPARENCY
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
THE
STRENGTHEN
SHOULD
OFFICE
AND RESEARCH
64
4

OF THEIR DECISIONS 12 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/6 80 .pdf [http://
46
Member of
perma.cc/B68K-N3 ] [hereinafter GAO-12-886]. In addition, the Independent
staff
FSOC
are
staff,
small
her
or
his
with
together
the FSOC with Insurance Expertise,
60.
5,
at
Id.
members.
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relatively small budget. 17 ' Whilst Dodd-Frank did create an Office of
Financial Research (OFR) to lend data-gathering and analytical support to the
FSOC, the FSOC does not have substantial resources to implement policies
reflecting the OFR's research. 172 For these reasons, some have suggested that
the FSOC is just a communication and coordination forum, a formal (albeit
more transparent and inclusive) continuation of the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets that existed pre-Dodd-Frank. 173 However, DoddFrank grants the FSOC a number of important powers that the President's
Working Group did not have. These can be divided into two categories:
powers over private entities and powers over other agencies. With regard to
the former, pursuant to section 113 of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC is responsible
for determining the non-bank financial companies that pose sufficient risk to
financial stability that should be subjected to heightened supervision and
regulation by the Federal Reserve. 174 The FSOC also has a similar power with
respect to financial market utilities.1 75 These designation powers have been
called "[b]y far the FSOC's most important substantive function." 76
With regard to the powers that the FSOC has over the other financial
regulatory agencies, these include section 119, which allows the FSOC to
resolve (with a non-binding recommendation) disputes amongst other
agencies, and section 1023, which allows the FSOC to invalidate any
rulemaking made by the CFPB that the FSOC deems threatening to stability.
At the weaker end of the spectrum is the FSOC's power pursuant to section
112(d) to request, but not compel, information from individual agencies.
Perhaps the most important of the FSOC's powers over the financial agencies
is section 120, which authorizes the FSOC to make recommendations that an
171 The FSOC's proposed budget for Financial Year 2015
was $8,690,355. Fin.
Stability Oversight Council, FSOC Budget Information, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/goverance-documents/Documents/FSOC%20Bud
get%20Information%20for%20Fiscal%20Yea /202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZZ5N-76M7].
172 It has also been argued that section 152(a) of Dodd-Frank, which makes the OFR
a
department of the Treasury rather than an independent office, has rendered the OFR highly
susceptible to political concerns and capture. Simon Johnson, The DisappointingOffice of
FinancialResearch, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/
01/ 3 0/the-disappointing-office-of-financial-research/?_r- 1 [http://perma.cc/HY2R-SBQQ].
173
Donald N. Lamson & Hilary Allen, Financial Stability Oversight Council:
Completely New or Deja Vu?, 96 BNA's BANKING REP. 974 (May 24, 2011).
174 To date, the FSOC has designated AIG, GE Capital, Prudential,
and MetLife as
Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). William M. Butler, Falling on
Deaf Ears: The FSOC's Evidentiary Hearing Provides Little Opportunity to Challenge a
Nonbank SIFI Designation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 663, 664 (2014); DealBook, MetLife
Formally Challenges "Systemically Important" Designation, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Oct. 3, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/metlife-formally-challengesdesignation-as-systemically-important/? r-0 [http://perma.cc/HAU7-ZYQN].
175 Dodd-Frank Act § 804, 12 U.S.C § 5463 (2012).
176
Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 327, 369 (2013). For a detailed discussion of how the designation process
works, see Butler, supra note 174, at 665-72.
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agency "apply new or heightened standards and safeguards . .. for a financial
activity or practice," if the FSOC determines that such activity or practice is
systemically risky. Because of these powers, some observers have concluded
77
that the FSOC is a "peak-level arbiter" with "strong oversight."' However,
some of the financial regulatory agencies have openly declared their resistance
78
bluntly stated
to conceding power to the "FSOCl : for example, the SEC has 79
'super-regulator."
a
as
its view that the FSOC was not designed
The legislative debates regarding Dodd-Frank make it clear that
legislators deliberately chose not to give the FSOC a direct power to compel
action from any agencies, 8 0 but the recommendation procedure in section 120
can be viewed as a stick that incentivizes individual agencies to respond to
8 1 Should an agency fail to respond to
informal suggestions for action.1
informal pressure, pursuant to section 120, the FSOC can publicly recommend
that certain steps be taken with respect to a particular financial activity or
practice (these can range between "limiting its scope, or applying particular
capital or risk management requirements to the conduct of the activity or
182 If the agency in question fails to
prohibiting the activity or practice").
1 7 7 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1187 (2012).
178 It should not be surprising that an attempt to impose centralized control over
existing financial regulatory agencies might invoke some type of resentment or resistance.
See David P. McCaffrey et al., The Appeal and Difficulties of ParticipativeSystems, 6
ORG. SCI. 603, 604 (1995).
79
DODD-FRANK
GAO-12-151,
OFF.,
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
1 U.S.
ANALYSES
ADDITIONAL
FROM
REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT

ACT
AND

COORDINATION 111 (2011). In response to a report drafted by the GAO on the regulatory
implementation of Dodd-Frank, the SEC and the OCC commented "that efforts to improve
coordination through FSOC must be balanced with the need to ensure that the
independence of each regulator is not affected." Id. at 40.
180 During a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Daniel K. Tarullo
commented:
[D]uring the debates preceding Dodd-Frank, some versions of proposals for what
eventually became the FSOC would have empowered the FSOC to override agency
action or inaction within its sphere of authority. Others, including many who favored
strong reforms, opposed this power, which would have created a kind of super-agency
with veto authority over all the regulators. Instead, the FSOC has the more limited
authority to present an agency with recommendations for action and the right to
receive an explanation should the agency not accept those recommendations.

Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Distinguished Jurist Lecture, Financial Stability
Regulation 25 (Oct. 10, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
2
newsevents/speech/tarullo 121010Oa.htm [http://perma.cc/TE5M-SCBZ]).
interactions, Freeman and Rossi note that: "We suspect that
interagency
181 Discussing
agency officials who wish to get things done can accomplish a great deal through such
informal channels. It also seems likely that informal approaches supplement more formal
coordination processes." Freeman & Rossi, supra note 177, at 1156.
182 Dodd-Frank Act § 120(b)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012).
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implement the FSOC's recommendations, then it is required to explain in
writing to the FSOC why it has failed to do so. 18 3 The FSOC is then required
to report such failure to Congress, which may result in the relevant agency
being called before Congress to explain its position. 184 If the prospect of
testifying before Congress is insufficient to force individual agencies to
comply with recommendations from the FSOC, Zaring has argued that the
likely next step is for the FSOC to designate the key financial institutions that
engage in the impugned financial activity as systemically important non-banks
pursuant to section 113, thus removing them to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Reserve and circumventing the authority of the primary regulatory agency.18 5
So far, this discussion of the FSOC's powers (and indeed almost all
discussion of the FSOC to date) has conceived of the FSOC as a unified entity.
However, this masks the interagency dynamics that are inevitable in a council
comprised of multiple regulatory bodies. There is something artificial about
discussing the FSOC's powers over the financial regulatory agencies, given
that the head of each of those member agencies is part of, and can to some
extent direct the actions of, the FSOC. However, not all of the FSOC's
members are created equal in terms of their ability to drive the FSOC's
agenda: in particular, there are a number of statutory provisions that work to
cement the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury within the FSOC. The
Treasury Secretary, in addition to chairing the FSOC, is the only member that
can, on its own, call a meeting of the FSOC (meetings are otherwise held
quarterly, or upon the vote of the majority of the FSOC's members). 186 The
Treasury Secretary as chair is also responsible for setting the agenda of any
meeting of the FSOC, and for testifying before Congress on behalf of the
FSOC. 187 Furthermore, the Treasury Secretary has a de facto veto right with
respect to designating non-bank financial companies for heightened prudential
supervision pursuant to section 113 (and rescinding those designations).' 8 8 As
such, by design, Dodd-Frank grants the Treasury Secretary an outsized role in
the FSOC's operations.
In addition, the Federal Reserve has long been considered the most
preeminent of the financial regulatory agencies, 189 and is likely to be
1 83 Id. § 120(c)(2).
1d. § 120(d)(2).
I 85 David Zaring, Money Market Fund Overhaul Is Early Test for Dodd-Frank,
N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 31, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/
money-market-fund-overhaul-is-early-test-for-dodd-frank/ [http://perma.cc/995U-MJ24].
186 Dodd-Frank Act § 11 1(e)(1).
I187
1d. § 112(a)(2)(N).
88
184

EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42083,
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK 7

(2011), http://www.1lsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r42083.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6JDFCYY].
189
Improving Financial Institution Supervision: Examining and Addressing
Regulatory Capture, Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of
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particularly assertive with respect to financial stability issues within the FSOC
(at least in the short term)1 90--- even in the absence of any statutory authority to
do so. The Federal Reserve and Treasury are also the members of the FSOC
that are chiefly responsible for coordinating with foreign regulators and
19
international standard setting bodies on financial stability issues. 1 As such,
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve seem to be "more equal" than the other
members of the FSOC, and when we talk about the prospect of the FSOC
exercising power over its members, more often than not we are
conceptualizing situations where the Chair of the Federal Reserve or the
Secretary of the Treasury might use the FSOC to direct the other agencies to
act in a particular way. Alternatively, when an FSOC member represents a
commission (such as the SEC or the CFTC), he or she may use the FSOC as a
forum for expressing his or her own personal views, rather than the consensus
92
position of the full commission that would otherwise guide the agency.1 In
such instances, the member may be attempting to use the FSOC as a vehicle to
effect policy change within their own agency, because they cannot get their
fellow commissioners to agree to such policy in the ordinary course.
This discussion of interagency interactions is largely hypothetical. To date,
the only real indication we have about how the FSOC will assert its powers
over other agencies derives from the regulatory haggling over money market
mutual fund (MMF) reform. By way of background, Mary Schapiro, the
former Chair of the SEC, had attempted to propose a rule that sought to
address risks that MMFs posed to financial stability, but she was unable to
convince a majority of the SEC commissioners to release the rule for
comment. 193 Then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner urged the FSOC to
recommend to the SEC (pursuant to section 120 of Dodd-Frank) that such
reform was necessary.1 94 In November of 2012, the FSOC sought public
comment on proposed recommendations to the SEC regarding three possible
avenues of reform of MMFs, indicating that any of those reforms would help

the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 58 (2014) (written
testimony of Robert C. Hockett, Professor, Cornell University).
1 90 See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
191 MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 188, at 8.

192 Section 2(b) of now-defunct bill H.R. 4387, 113th Cong. (2014), sought to address
this by giving each of the members of each agency with a multi-member commission a seat
on the FSOC. Such a proposal, however, would most likely have rendered the FSOC
unworkable, as it would have brought up to twenty more people to the table. Furthermore,
because each agency would still have only had one vote, it would have required a second
layer of consensus before the FSOC could take any action. See id.
193 Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: EmbracingSponsor Support in Money
Market Fund Reform 19-21 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law,
Paper No. 275, 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract-2456255 [http://perma.cc/5HBV-ES33].
194Id. at 22.

2015]

FINANCIAL STABILITY

Ill19

mitigate the dangers that MMFs pose to financial stability.1 95 In response, on
June 5, 2013, the SEC promulgated a proposed rule that covered two potential
avenues for reform, but each of these two avenues was on a much more
limited scale than any of the FSOC's proposals.1 96 The SEC's rule was
adopted as final, with some amendments, on July 23, 2014.197 Upon the
release of these final rules, Treasury Secretary Lew, the current Treasury
Secretary and chair of the FSOC, issued the somewhat cryptic statement that
"[w]hile the SEC's reforms will require careful consideration and continued
monitoring of their effectiveness in addressing risks to financial stability, the
SEC's final rule is a significant step forward." 98 It remains to be seen whether
the FSOC will take any further steps towards intervention. 199
195 The options were:
1) [R]equiring MMFs to switch from a fixed to a floating NAV, 2) providing for a
NAV capital buffer of up to 1%, supplied by a MMF sponsor together with a required
minimum balance at risk for MMF investors, or 3) requiring a risk-based capital
buffer of up to 3%, which could be combined with other risk-reducing measures.

Id. at 22-23.
196 The Securities and Exchange Commission summarized the rule as follows:
The first alternative proposal would require money market funds to sell and redeem
shares based on the current market-based value of the securities in their underlying

portfolios, rounded to the fourth decimal place (e.g., $1.0000), i.e., transact at a
"floating" net asset value per share ("NAy"). The second alternative proposal would
require money market funds to impose a liquidity fee (unless the fund's board
determines that it is not in the best interest of the fund) if a fund's liquidity levels fell
below a specified threshold and would permit the funds to suspend redemptions
temporarily, i.e., to "gate" the fund under the same circumstances.

Securities and Exchange Commission, Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form
PF, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,834 (proposed rule June 19, 2013). These more limited reforms have
been critiqued by Sheila Bair as leaving "a number of money market funds, fund investors
and the markets unprotected and at risk for destabilizing runs. It also creates real incentives
for gaming and arbitrage." Nathaniel Popper, S.E.C Proposes Changes in Money Funds,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 5, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/
05/s-e-c-votes-to-take-next-step-on-money-market-funds/ [http://perma.ccIY8LW-BQQS].
197 The changes made to the proposed rules include the removal of exemptions for
institutional non-government money market funds, as well as requirements for increased
diversification of portfolios, enhanced stress testing, and increased transparency. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79
Fed. Reg. 47,736 (final rule Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270,
274, 279).
198 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement from Secretary Lew on the
Final Money Market Mutual Fund Rule by the SEC (July 23, 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j l2583.aspx [http://perma.cc/
K79D-2DQS].
199The FSOC did indicate recently that it would look into the asset management
industry more broadly, issuing a Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products
and Activities that stated that while the SEC "is undertaking several initiatives that would
apply to investment companies and investment advisers regulated by the SEC and may
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STRUCTURE AND MANDATE

Given the youth of the FSOC, any analysis of the FSOC's powers must by
necessity be somewhat speculative. The interactions between the FSOC and
the other financial regulatory agencies will, over time, add more color to our
understanding of the FSOC. Even at the tender age of five, though, there are
already reasons to be concerned about whether the FSOC is up to the vital
challenge of promoting financial stability.
This Article has already made the case that financial regulation should be
used to proactively pursue financial stability: the social costs of ex post
responses to financial stability, and their incomplete efficacy in mitigating the
economic fallout from financial crises, dictate that a financial stability
regulator should not simply allow instability to develop, and then attempt to
clean it up afterwards. 200 However, when the economy is performing well and
the financial system seems to be working smoothly, any regulatory
intervention will likely be met with tepid public support and strident industry
opposition. 20 1 Ideally, the FSOC would be structured in the way that best
insulates it from these political realities, but as this Part will explore, there are
flaws in the FSOC's structure and mandate that will likely increase its
susceptibility to the cycle of political economy and to regulatory capture.
A. Problems with the FSOC's Structure
The FSOC is, at its core, a committee that is designed to work by
"leverag[ing] the expertise that already exists at each [financial regulatory]
agency," 20 2 rather than performing extensive regulatory functions itself. As
such, the efficacy of the FSOC will be stunted if these individual agencies do
not contribute to the FSOC's financial stability mission. To put it another way,
individual members of the FSOC will "come as advocates for their agency's
203 and if the
positions and as defenders of their agency's turf and power,"
institutions that those members represent do not see financial stability as their
204
end goal, a council of those members will not prioritize financial stability.
address some of the risks described in this Notice[,] the SEC's initiatives are not
specifically focused on financial stability." Notice Seeking Comment on Asset
Management Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,488, 77,489 (Dec. 24, 2014)
(footnote omitted).
20 0
See supra Part II.
20 1
See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
20 2
FSOC FAQs, supra note 164.
203 Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual
Biases in Complex Organizations Contributedto the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 807, 838-39 (2010).
204
Bar-Gill and Warren have noted that "[e]ffective regulation requires both authority
and motivation." Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 85 (2008). The agencies represented on the FSOC have historically had both
authority and motivations other than financial stability: the OCC, the FDIC, and the
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An international peer review of the United States' financial regulatory system
released by the Financial Stability Board in August 2013 raised some of these
issues, noting:
[T]he FSOC's decisions and actions reflect the views of a wide range of
agencies with different mandates and interests. This might affect in some
cases the FSOC's ability to take decisions in an effective and prompt manner,
as the desire to reach a reasonable consensus among a large group of
authorities might come at the expense of delivering clear and timely
messages....

... Furthermore, the scope of the [FSOC's systemic] risk analysis
currently is relatively narrow as it tends to reflect the sectoral perspectives of
individual member agencies, rather than providing a system-wide view of
interconnections and exposures to risks. 2 05
This Part will explore in detail these, and other, problems that the FSOC's
structure pose for financial stability regulation.

1. FederalReserve Dominance
There is one member of the FSOC that is actively pursuing the goal of
financial stability post-Crisis: although the Federal Reserve does not have an
express statutory financial stability mandate, 206 it takes the position that its
"financial stability mandate is seen in the penumbra of the Federal Reserve

NCUA, for example, have tended to focus on banks and their safety and soundness, rather
than on the stability of the financial system as a whole, or the macroeconomic effects of
financial system failure. Id. at 90. Similarly, the SEC has traditionally focused on
disclosure and investor protection, rather than on addressing structural issues within
financial markets. Walter Werner, The SEC as Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 755
(1984).
20 5

FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Aug. 2013),

http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r 130827.pdf [http://perma.cc/
6XPH-V3GJ].
206 The Federal Reserve's founding legislation provides only that:
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.
12 U.S.C.

§ 225(a) (2012).
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Act, and that is legally sufficient." 207 Given the importance of financial
stability, it is in many respects a good thing that a powerful body like the
Federal Reserve has committed to preserving it.208 However, there is a concern
that--despite the best of intentions and a commitment to a macroprudential
approach to financial regulation 209-the Federal Reserve's efforts will be
primarily informed by its historic concern with the safety and soundness of
banking institutions, 2 10 and that it will therefore monitor threats to the
financial system through bank-tinted lenses. 2 11 Dodd-Frank itself encourages
207 Thomas C. Baxter stated:
The Federal Reserve's financial stability mandate is seen in the penumbra of the
Federal Reserve Act, and that is legally sufficient. . . . [L]eading economic thinkers
would now say, and the financial crisis seems to offer us the perfect illustration, that
price stability and maximum employment are possible only in a context of financial
stability.
Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the Future of Banking Regulation and Supervision in the EU Conference,
Financial Stability: The Role of the Federal Reserve System (Nov. 15, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/baxl31120.html [http://
perma.cc/Y9FP-44T3]).
208 It is, of course, possible that commitment to this unofficial mandate will wane over
time. The Federal Reserve has often been critiqued for neglecting its statutorily mandated
focus on maximum employment in favor of a single-minded focus on inflation.
The Federal Reserve: The Other Mandate, ECONOMIST (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/fmance-and-economics/21568426-fed-specifies-unemploy
ment-threshold-raising-rates-other-mandate [http://perma.cc/KMP6-E4BY]. It is possible
that the Federal Reserve's enthusiasm for its implicit financial stability mandate could
suffer the same fate.
2 09
Bernanke, supra note 5, at 5. For example, the Federal Reserve has created a new
"Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research" to "identif[y] and analyze[] potential
threats to financial stability; monitor[] financial markets, institutions, and structures; and
assess[] and recommend[] policy alternatives to address these threats." The Economists:
Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/fsprstaff.htm [http://perma.cc/9EG9-BMLH]
(last updated Oct. 13, 2015).
2 10
In addition to being the United States' central bank, the Federal Reserve is (and has
been since well before the Financial Crisis) the primary federal regulator for bank holding
companies, and for state-chartered banks that are a member of the Federal Reserve System.
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 61.

&

211 Taylor has argued that "the expertise necessary to regulate investment banks and
insurance companies does not naturally reside in central banks." Taylor, supra note 80, at
85. Providers of non-banking financial services who will be regulated by the Federal
Reserve if designated as a SIFI pursuant to section 113 of Dodd-Frank have been
particularly vociferous about their concerns that the Federal Reserve will take a "one-sizefits-all" banking-style approach to regulating these SIFIs. For example, the Chamber of
Commerce has alleged that the FSOC is "over-populated with bank regulators and unduly
influenced by that regulatory perspective." Letter from David Hirshmann, President
CEO, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Timothy Geithner, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury 5 (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/
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the Federal Reserve to respond to stability threats in a bank-centric way:
section 115 encourages the Federal Reserve to apply heightened prudential
requirements that are reminiscent of typical bank regulatory tools to the nonbank financial institutions that have been designated as SIFIs. 212 However, as
this section will explore, to the extent that the dominance of the Chair of the
Federal Reserve within the FSOC shuts out other agencies' non-bank
perspectives about how risks might build and be transmitted through the
financial system (and how such risks should be addressed), such dominance is
a cause for concern.
The organizational economics literature suggests that the best way to
cultivate regulatory imagination about potential risks to stability is to
synthesize inputs from regulators with different perspectives; 2 13 non-banking
perspectives about threats to financial stability are unique and valuable
contributions to financial stability regulation. 2 14 Financial institutions can
certainly fail because of runs on their short-term funding, and if an institution
is sufficiently large, then its failure can certainly have systemic ramifications.
However, institutional failure may not always result from a funding run, and
the failure of a number of smaller, non-bank institutions with correlated

uploads/2010/04/2012-11.5-MMF-Letter-to-Geithner.pdf [http://perma.cc/FX66-SSTS].
One of the key supervisory innovations following the Financial Crisis was the
commencement of annual stress tests of large banks and designated SIFIs to determine
whether "a covered company has the capital, on a total consolidated basis, necessary to
absorb losses and continue its operations by maintaining ready access to funding, meeting
its obligations to creditors and other counterparties, and continuing to serve as a credit
intermediary under adverse economic and financial conditions." Again, this focus on
capital reflects typical bank regulatory notions about the importance of safety and
soundness of institutions See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., DODD-FRANK
ACT STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

(Mar. 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast
20130314.pdf [http://perma.cc/9JJS-NFE3].
212 As noted by William M. Butler:

2013 results

Nonbank SIFIs, many for the first time, will be subject to oversight by the Federal
Reserve and regulations that include capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity
requirements, resolution plans or living wills, credit exposure report requirements,
concentration limits, contingent capital requirements, public disclosures, short-term
debt limits, and other risk management requirements that the FSOC may recommend

to the Federal Reserve.
Butler,
supra note 174, at 668.
2 13
In complex and rapidly changing environments, "a loosely
knit, decentralized
structure of multiple agencies is likely to be optimal," because a decentralized structure
allows for more and new ideas to be developed and shared. Luis Garicano & Richard A.
Posner, Intelligence Failures: An OrganizationalEconomics Perspective, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 151, 157 (2005).
2 14
It is beneficial for the FSOC to hear views about systemic risk from bodies
other
than the Federal Reserve. Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between
ConsumerFinancialProtectionand Systemic Risk, 4 FIU L. REV. 435, 461 (2009).
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2 15 Financial instability can arise
exposures can also precipitate instability.
even when institutions do not fail, perhaps because a problem with a
widespread asset class has damaged confidence in a market such that capital
intermediation is interrupted. 2 16 As such, financial stability regulators need to
be concerned with much more than the safety and soundness of banks and
large financial institutions: they need to be constantly probing interlinkages
between different institutions and markets, and anticipating potential shocks
2 17
that could ripple along those interlinkages.
To its credit, the FSOC has been exploring novel ways in which insurance
firms can pose systemic risk, not restricting its analysis to large insurers'
dependence on short-term funding (although concerns about such reliance
have indeed loomed large in the FSOC's decisions to designate AIG,
Prudential, and MetLife as SIFIs). 21 8 For example, the FSOC has raised
concerns about the dependence of other financial firms on insurers for
coverage, and the consequences for those other financial firms if such
coverage were to become unavailable as a result of "a spike in claims due to
correlated risks, other types of actuarial miscalculations or under-reserving,
undercapitalization, or portfolio losses." 2 19 However, McCoy notes that to
date, the FSOC has not been very clear in articulating exactly what types of
insurance coverage are susceptible to such an analysis, and what other
220 A
financial firms might be significantly harmed should coverage dry up.
close familiarity with the insurance industry is vital in fully developing such
theories. Additionally, insurance regulators have the best information about
the investments made by insurance companies (particularly in corporate bond
markets), and an understanding of this demand can be integral to
22 1 Insurance
understanding the development of bubbles in such markets.
experts must therefore be heard on matters of financial stability.

215 "[W]e should note, the weakest link in the financial stability chain might be small,
rather than large, financial intermediaries." Eric S. Rosengren, President & CEO, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Bos., Keynote Remarks at the Stanford Finance Forum, Defining
Financial Stability, and Some Policy Implications of Applying the Definition, 9 (June 3,
2
2011) (transcript available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/ 011/
.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJL9-TUD6]).
060311/060311
2
16

d. at 4.

217 The shock that precipitates financial instability might not even come from within
the financial system itself: as the FSOC recently identified, it could be an act of
cyberterrorism targeting financial system infrastructure. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 5 (2011) [FSOC REPORT].

218 For a discussion of the FSOC's concerns regarding the susceptibility of AIG,
Prudential, and MetLife to runs, see Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the
Shifting Balance of State and Federal Authority over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 42-48), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/view
[http://perma.cc/N4HC-UD3E].
content.cgi?article=1938&context-Isfp
2 19
Id. (manuscript at 66).
22 0
Id. (manuscript at 65-67).
221 Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 76, at 1589-99.
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Similarly, as the "cop on the beat" taking complaints regarding consumer
financial products, the CFPB is likely to be the first agency to see evidence of
a bubble in a particular class of consumer financial products (including
products that are offered by institutions that are not otherwise regulated by any
financial regulatory agency), 222 and so its input is key to the financial stability
project. Patterns of consumer complaints with respect to a particular financial
-

institution can also be an early warning of problems with that institution 223

other indicators of trouble (like the regulatory capital standards that are the
focus of bank-centric regulation) tend to lag behind. 22 4 Finally, consumer
protection regulation can promote financial stability by preventing or
mitigating negative market distortions that result from imperfectly informed
(and bubble-creating) consumer choices. 2 25 The CFPB's input is therefore also
integral to financial stability regulation.
The SEC's expertise with regard to securities markets is also invaluable.
For example, a number of highly publicized computer glitches in recent years
have focused regulatory scrutiny on high frequency trading, including the
Flash Crash on May 6, 2010,226 and the losses suffered by Knight Capital on
August 1, 2012.227 While neither of these market disruptions had a broad
systemic impact, many are concerned that similar incidents could precipitate a
full-blown crisis in the future. 228 The SEC is also likely to know more than the
222

"The jurisdiction of the Bureau . .

extends to the world of payday lenders, credit

counselors and pawn shops." Donald N. Lamson & Hilary Allen, Consumer Financial
Protection:It's a Smaller World After All, 96 BNA's BANKING REP. 552 (Mar. 22, 2011).
223
See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning ConsumerDispute
Resolution: A Case
Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TuL. L.

REV.2 2735
(2009).
4

ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS'
NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 190 (2014).

225 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 204, at 58-59. It is also worth exploring
whether the
CFPB could or should engage in class-action-like contract modification of oppressive
contracts that are causing the build-up of systemic risk. In this way, the CFPB could act as
a "safety valve," releasing risk from the system. For a discussion of the need for such
safety valves, see Pistor, supra note 94, at 329.
226 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N & U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF
THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY

ISSUES 2 (Sept. 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/20 1 0/marketevents-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RGN-AJN5].
227 Nathaniel Popper, Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch
Cost It $440 Million, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 2, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/
knight-capital-says-trading-nishap-cost-it-440-million/?_rP1 [http://perma.cc/3ND8-HBG6].
228
Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 706 (2013).
[A]lgorithmic trades tend to be correlated, suggesting that the HFT strategies used in
the market are not as diverse as those used by human traders. In this context, shocks
hitting the small number of very active algorithmic traders might affect the entire
market. And, because high frequency trading firms are often very lightly capitalised,
this could generate failures. Handling the corresponding counterparty risk could be
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Federal Reserve about the various brokers or dealers that act as market makers
for securities. 229 Because these market makers "stand[] ready to buy and sell a
particular stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted
then liquidity
price," 230 if a number of market makers are compromised,
2 3 1 A focus on the
within the financial system might be seriously disrupted.
workings of the securities markets is thus necessary as part of the financial
stability project, even if none of the players therein are deemed large enough
to be a problem from a "too big to fail" perspective.
The foregoing does not purport in any way to be an exhaustive discussion
of the sources of systemic risk in our financial system. However, the examples
given here are sufficient to illustrate that a limited focus on the solvency of
banks and other large financial institutions runs the risk of neglecting
important systemic risks, particularly those being created by the herd behavior
of smaller institutions. 232 As such, the efficacy of financial stability regulation
is likely to be stunted unless all of the financial regulatory agencies-not just
the Federal Reserve-commit to the task of identifying and addressing threats
to financial stability. It is also worth noting that if all of the regulatory
agencies were to rise to this challenge, then supervision and monitoring of
non-bank institutions' destabilizing behaviors could be effected without
designating institutions as SIFIs subject to the Federal Reserve's jurisdiction233
potentially neutralizing the politically-charged issue of SIFI designation.
2. Treasury Dominance
The dominance of the Treasury Secretary within the FSOC raises more
concerns than the prominence of the Federal Reserve. In addition to being the
Chairperson of the FSOC, the Treasury Secretary has perhaps the greatest
powers of any member of the FSOC (including the power to set the FSOC's
agenda, and to veto any designation of a financial institution as subject to
heightened prudential supervision).234 Furthermore, the Treasury Department
daunting, given that HFT firms turn over their positions many times a day, while
clearing systems operate at a much lower frequency. Combined, these elements could
generate systemic market disruptions.
Bruno Biais & Paul Woolley, The Flip Side: High Frequency Trading, FIN. WORLD,
Feb. 2012, at 34, 35, http://www.1se.ac.uk/fmg/researchProgrammes/paulWoolleyCentre/
pdf/FinancialWorldArticle.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TES-XPCJ].
229 Brokers and dealers are regulated by the SEC pursuant to section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(2012).
230 Market Maker, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mktmaker.htm [http://perma.cc/4TUX-V27H] (last modified Mar. 17, 2000).
231 Rosengren, supra note 215, at 13.
232 Stiglitz, supranote 97, at 17.
233 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
234See supra text accompanying notes 186-88. The Treasury Secretary is also
for a
responsible for appointing the person who controls the oral hearing proceedings
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provides the FSOC with much of its administrative support,23 5 and also houses
and exerts control over the OFR 236 (which is a primary source of the FSOC's
data and analysis regarding emerging threats to financial stability). 2 37 This Part
will explore how placement of a political figure like the Treasury Secretary at
the apex of the FSOC may jeopardize the FSOC's ability to fulfill its financial
stability mandate.
As this Article has explored, political economy is one of the greatest
difficulties that ex ante financial stability regulation faces. 23 8 The vagaries of
politics have long been thought to be inimical to good financial regulation;
instead, financial regulatory agency independence has traditionally been
favored because it allows for high technical expertise, policy stability and
uniformity, and also a longer term perspective 239 (the latter of which is
particularly essential to financial stability regulation). 240 However, given that
the Treasury Secretary is a presidential cabinet appointee removable at will, he
or she is less insulated from the political whims of the executive than any of
the other members of the FSOC, 24 1 and is more likely to be susceptible to
"timing considerations, adverse public opinion, and interest group
pressures."242 Thus, by placing the Treasury Secretary at the pinnacle of the
financial institution seeking to dispute its designation as a SIFI. Butler, supra note 174, at
678.
235 The GAO reported that:
[The FSOC] has established a dedicated policy office within Treasury's Office of
Domestic Finance, led by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, which functions as the FSOC

Secretariat. Among other duties, the policy office works with staff of other FSOC
members to support FSOC in its day-to-day operations by helping
to draft rules,
studies, and reports and prepare and circulate relevant materials to agency members

prior to council meetings. The office also serves as a mechanism to bring issues to the
council quickly.

GAO-12-886,
supra note 170, at 12.
236
The OFR must consult with the Secretary of the Treasury
in connection with any
rulemaking, the establishment of its budget, and personnel hiring and compensation.
Jennifer S. Taub, Great Expectations for the Office of FinancialResearch, in WILL IT
WORK? How WILL WE KNow? THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REFORM 23, 24-25 (Michael

Konczal ed., Roosevelt Institute 2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/
Will% 2 0t%20Work%20How%2OWill%2OWe%2OKnowo.pdf [http://perma.cc/BN2VARMP].
237 Dodd-Frank Act § 152(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5342
(2012).
238
See supra text accompanying notes 81-96.
239 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 340.
240 Allen, supra note 31, at 206.

241 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 332; see also DAVID
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
TIfE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 12

UNDERSTANDING

(2011) ("Because the Treasury secretary is directly responsible to the President, he is the
least independent, and the most political, of the financial regulators. Yet the Treasury
secretary is given leadership responsibility on the new Financial Stability Oversight
Council
24 2 and in other areas.").
Gadinis, supra note 176, at 388.
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only United States body expressly charged with addressing threats to financial
stability, Dodd-Frank has to some extent reversed the guiding principle of
independence and increased the susceptibility of the243FSOC, and financial
stability regulation, to the whims of political economy.
In boom times, it may be too much to expect that a Treasury-led FSOC
will aggressively pursue financial stability (for example, by recommending
that individual agencies apply heightened safeguards to profitable activities
pursuant to section 120, or by designating profitable institutions as subject to
enhanced regulatory scrutiny pursuant to section 113). By virtue of its control
over the FSOC's agenda, the Treasury Secretary has the power to prevent the
FSOC from even discussing potential sources of systemic risk that are
politically "too hot to handle." It has also been argued that the Treasury's
control over the OFR could ensure that the OFR's information gathering and
analysis functions reflect the politically expedient policy of "defend[ing]
existing practices of the financial sector and provid[ing] generous support
244 Furthermore, while this Article has
when important firms need assistance."
largely focused on the difficulties of regulating for financial stability when the
financial system is (or appears to be) performing well, the increased
politicization of financial stability regulation can also be problematic once a
financial crisis has developed. As Gadinis notes, "there is a significant risk that
voters, in the midst of uncertainty and widespread skepticism, might press
politicians to refrain from intervening in the financial industry when
24 5 As such, the Treasury
intervening would be otherwise appropriate."
Secretary's role in the FSOC is potentially problematic in bad times as well as
good.
3. Broader CoordinationChallenges
The dominance of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve within the FSOC
is thus undesirable in many respects. Unfortunately, the heads of the other
financial regulatory agencies are unlikely to serve as a counterbalance within
the FSOC. It is difficult for the various financial regulatory agencies, all of
which have pre-existing regulatory priorities and identities that potentially
conflict with a focus on financial stability matters, to coordinate on financial
stability matters. 246 Going forward, these agencies are even less likely to focus
243 Barkow notes that when a politicized executive agency is hierarchically superior to,
and able to direct, independent regulatory agencies, then the independence of those
agencies is rendered meaningless. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding
Through InstitutionalDesign, 89 TEx. L. REV. 15, 51 (2010).
Capture
244
Johnson, supra note 172.
245 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 385.
246 According to the GAO:
[The] FSOC's effectiveness [in providing for a more comprehensive view of threats to
U.S. financial stability] hinges to a large extent on collaboration among its many
members, almost all of whom come from state and federal agencies with their own
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on financial stability issues as the economy improves, and the importance of
financial stability regulation fades from public attention. Furthermore, the very
existence of the FSOC may disincentivize such focus: the FSOC may provide
a pretext for the other financial regulatory agencies to shirk any responsibility
they might otherwise have felt to take action in the face of financial
instability. 24 7
To be clear, the other financial regulatory agencies do not have any
express responsibilities with respect to financial stability. However, the
statutory requirement in section 112(b) of Dodd-Frank that each voting
member of the FSOC submit an annual statement to Congress regarding extant
threats to financial stability gives each such member (and their agency) an
implicit direction to monitor such threats. 248 Sections 113 and 804 implicitly
direct each member to keep an eye on SIFIs and market utilities, in order to
determine whether they should be designated as requiring heightened
supervision. 249 Similarly, section 120 implicitly directs each member to
monitor potentially problematic financial activities or practices, to enable them
to determine whether the FSOC should make a recommendation to apply new
or heightened standards or safeguards to such activities or practices. 2 50 Given
that none of these obligations are particularly firm, though, there is a real
possibility that the FSOC's members will seek to shirk such responsibilitiesparticularly when taking action is too challenging or politically unpalatableand attribute blame for any notable failures to the FSOC as a whole. 2 51

specific statutory

missions. In testifying on the coordination

of Dodd-Frank

rulemakings assigned to specific FSOC members, before the U.S. House Financial
Services Committee in October 2011, the chairperson of FSOC recognized this
challenge. He noted that the coordination challenge in the rulemaking process was

hard because the Dodd-Frank Act left in place a financial system with a complicated
set of independent agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and different
responsibilities.

GAO-12-886, supra note 170, at 8.
247 Regarding the risk of shirking, see Barkow, supra note
243, at 56 ("It is all too easy
for agencies to point fingers at each other with no one ultimately held accountable.").
248 Dodd-Frank Act § 112(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
249
See Id. §§ 113, 804.
250
See Id. § 120.
251 The beginnings of such a dynamic can perhaps be inferred from
a recent speech by
SEC Chair Mary Jo White, which included the text:
Truly tackling systemic risk in any area, obviously, demands a broader program

than one agency can execute. Systemic risks cannot be addressed alone-they are,
after all, "systemic." Risks that could cascade through our financial system could have
an impact on a range of market participants, many of which we do not oversee. The
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is an important forum for studying and
identifying systemic risks across different markets and market participants. The
market perspective that the SEC brings is an essential component of FSOC's efforts.
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The potential for the FSOC to serve as a pretext for shirking has not yet
been explored in the financial regulatory literature, but there is a burgeoning
administrative law literature on interagency interaction that may assist here.
Freeman and Rossi, for example, have considered whether "where
responsibility is shared, agencies might be more inclined to shirk their
by
duties." 252 They conclude that such shirking is, in fact, often prevented
253 The
monitoring.
interagency
coordination mechanisms that facilitate
coordination mechanisms that Freeman and Rossi have in mind include
254 which is one of the key functions of the
mandated interagency consultation,
25 5 However, there are a number of
FSOC's mandated quarterly meetings.
as a
reasons to be less than sanguine regarding the prospect of the FSOC
256
context.
stability
facilitator of interagency monitoring in the financial
First, any requirement for the FSOC's members (and their agencies) to
257
monitor threats to financial stability on an ongoing basis is, at best, implicit.

It is difficult for any member of the FSOC (or the public) to hold another
member accountable for shirking such nebulous obligations. Although the
FSOC could use its recommendation power under section 120 of the DoddFrank Act to bring a shirking agency into line, because it has limited resources
of its own, the FSOC qua FSOC is in no position to monitor financial
regulatory agencies. 258 Monitoring must therefore come from the FSOC's
members and their agencies, and given that those agencies have at best
implicit financial stability obligations themselves, they are not required to
focus on potentially destabilizing activities of other agencies. The only players
likely to take action in this context are the Federal Reserve, which views itself
as having a financial stability mandate, and the Treasury, if the political winds
And FSOC's current review of the potential risks to the stability of U.S. financial
system of asset managers is a complement to the work we are now undertaking.

Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the New York Times DealBook
Opportunities for Tomorrow Conference, Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory
at
Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry (Dec. 11, 2014) (transcript available
[http://
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543677722#.VKy7SIu61UQ
published its
perma.cc/E6TH-D4EE]). White gave this speech the week before the FSOC
note 199,
supra
Activities,
and
Products
Management
Asset
on
Comment
Notice Seeking
systemic risk
for
responsibility
whereby
labor
of
division
pre-agreed
a
suggesting
perhaps
would fall on the FSOC rather than the SEC.
252 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 177, at 1187.
253Id. at 1188.
2 54
Id. at 1157, 1160.
2 55
See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at 129.
256 Ongoing cooperation and commitment with respect to financial stability regulation
should be distinguished from instances of joint-rulemaking required by Dodd-Frank,
where it is very clear that particular agencies are responsible for making the rules, and thus
clear when shirking has occurred. Id. at 1191.
it is 2very
57
See supra notes 248-51.
258 This is in contrast to situations where there is a true lead agency that is driving the
process and can be held accountable. Id. at 1192.
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are blowing against a particular financial agency, product, or activity. As this
Part has already established, it is less than ideal that interagency monitoring
always be informed by such a politicized or bank-centric perspective.
It is possible that, even in the absence of any statutory obligation for the
financial regulatory agencies to pursue financial stability, each of those
agencies may be incentivized to monitor each other's activities because of the
fear of the reputational harm they will suffer if a financial crisis occurs:
Marisam has argued that interagency monitoring will prevent shirking when
the activities of one agency have negative externalities for other agencies with
overlapping competencies. 259 However, Marisam acknowledges that the risk
of shirking rises when various agencies are responsible for the same
task,
instead of being responsible for different information or subtasks, because it is
easier to spread blame for any regulatory failures. 26 0 Financial crises are such
complex events that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of such crises, 26 1
and thus to point fingers at particular regulatory failures. Furthermore, there is
a lot of overlap in financial regulatory agency competencies-the OCC, the
FDIC, and the Federal Reserve cover very similar territory when regulating
banks and bank holding companies, 262 as do the SEC and the CFTC when they
are regulating derivatives. 2 63 Given these circumstances, it is perhaps not
surprising that the history of financial agency interactions suggests a tendency
for agencies to shirk regulatory responsibilities that are unpopular with the
regulated industry. Banking regulators' approach to consumer financial
protection prior to the Financial Crisis is illustrative of this tendency: as one
author noted, "because consumer protection has been everyone's
responsibility, it has been no one's responsibility, and accountability and
performance have suffered therewith." 2 64 If the FSOC is viewed as having sole
responsibility for financial stability, and if the FSOC is not sufficiently robust
or has insufficient resources to actually pursue those financial stability
objectives, financial stability may also become the responsibility of no one (or
no one other than the Federal Reserve and Treasury).
To date, the FSOC's response to its coordination problems has largely
consisted of forming committees, intended to "support collaboration among
FSOC members both on a formal and informal basis." 265 These committees
259
Jason Marisam, InteragencyAdministration,45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 183, 214-15
(2013).
260I. at 215.
261 Allen, supranote 122, at 893.
2 62

CARNELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 443.

263 See Dodd-Frank Act tit. 7, 15 U.S.C. § 8301 (2012).
264 Enhanced Consumer FinancialProtectionAfter the Financial
Crisis: Hearing on
Examining the Impact of the FinancialCrisis on Consumers and How the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 Will Enhance Consumer
FinancialProtection Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 106 (2011) (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center) [hereinafter Levitin Testimony].
265
Clowers Statement, supra note 161, at 14.
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include a Systemic Risk Committee, a Designation of Non-bank Financial
Companies Committee, a Designation of Financial Market Utilities
2 66
Committee, and a Heightened Prudential Standards Committee.
Membership of these committees may, to some extent, serve to train individual
agency focus on financial stability matters. However, because the FSOC "does
not keep detailed records of deliberations or discussions that take place at the
267 there would be little evidence
council's meetings or at the committee level,"
available from the committee's deliberations to hold any agency accountable
for shirking its implicit obligations. Shirking could perhaps be reduced by
requiring more transparency regarding the deliberations of the FSOC and its
committees (although transparency with regard to financial stability
268 but I suspect that this, and other
deliberations is fraught for other reasons),
process-oriented reforms suggested by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), 269 would have a limited impact on the commitment of the FSOC's
member agencies to financial stability concerns. Similarly, although the FSOC
is overseen by a Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight
on
(CIGFO), to date this council has kept a relatively low profile and focused 270
Dodd-Frank.
the FSOC's compliance with discrete processes set out in
Again, I suspect that the CIGFO will have a limited impact on the commitment
of the FSOC's member agencies to financial stability concerns.
Other reform options have been suggested by Representative Scott Garrett
(R-NJ), and Senator David Vitter (R-LA), both of whom have introduced bills
27
proposing to restructure the FSOC. 1 Garrett's bill died with the end of the
113th Congress in January 2015, but if it had been enacted, section 2(b)
thereof would have made every member of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, the SEC, the CFTC, the FDIC, and the National Credit Union
266 There is also a Deputies Committee, an Orderly Liquidation Committee, and a Data
Id. at 3.
Committee.
2
67

1d. at 9.

2681n its transparency policy, the FSOC notes that:
The Council will open its meetings to the public whenever possible. At the same time,
the central mission of the Council is to monitor systemic and emerging threats. This
will require discussion of supervisory and other market-sensitive data, including
information about individual firms, transactions, and markets that may only be

obtained if maintained on a confidential basis. Protection of this information will be
necessary in order to prevent destabilizing market speculation that could occur if that
information were to be disclosed.
FIN.

STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,

TRANSPARENCY

POLICY FOR THE FINANCIAL

STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL 1 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FSOCtransparencypolicy.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZC9-CT4B].
269The GAO has recommended a number of other process-oriented reforms to the
FSOC, as outlined in Clowers Statement, supra note 161, at 8.
270 COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GEN. ON FIN. OVERSIGHT, ANNUAL REPORT 1-3 (July

2014), http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/CIGFO%
[http://perma.cc/LK4P-SGVK].
ANNUAL%20REPORT%202014%2OFINAL.pdf
271
H.R. 4387, 113th Cong. (2014).

2
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Administration (NCUA) a member of the FSOC-bringing twenty more
people to the table at any FSOC meeting on financial stability matters (but still
giving each agency only one vote, requiring each multi-party commission to
agree to take action before the FSOC as a whole could do so).272 Furthermore,
section 2(c) of the bill would have required that:
[A]t any FSOC meeting . . [e]ven if the meeting was being held in private, it
could be attended by up to 83 legislators-the 61 members of the House
Financial Services Committee and the 22 members of the Senate Banking
Committee. If staff members from the FSOC member agencies assembled for
a meeting, the Financial Services and Banking Committee staffs would also
3
have to be invited.27
The combined effect of these provisions would have been to increase the
susceptibility of the FSOC to political pressure, and to make the FSOC more
cumbersome and stymie its ability to act.274

Vitter's bill, titled the "Terminating the Expansion of Too-Big-To-Fail Act
of 2015"275 was introduced in January of 2015. The majority of Vitter's bill is
focused on repealing the FSOC's designation power.276 However, several
provisions of Vitter's bill reach beyond the designation process and have the
potential to limit the FSOC's ability to discharge its financial stability mandate
more generally. These include: (i) the repeal of section 120(d)(3) of DoddFrank, which directs the FSOC to consider legislation regulating non-bank
financial institutions that have no primary federal regulator, but pose risks to
financial stability; 277 (ii) the repeal of sections 216 and 217 of Dodd-Frank,

which require studies relating to domestic and international procedures for the
resolution of non-bank financial institutions; 278 and (iii) the repeal of the entire
Title VIII of Dodd-Frank, which relates to regulation of payment and clearing
and settlement systems (sometimes referred to as the "plumbing" of the
financial system). 2 79 As Part V will explore in more detail, reform of the
FSOC needs to move in the opposite direction to the Garrett and Vitter Bills.

272

273

274

See id § 2(b).
Norris, supra note 8.

"That would seem to be a recipe to hamstring FSOC, but members of the

committee see it as a matter of openness and fairness." Id. Similarly, Lubben has noted that
the bill "purports to be aimed at increasing transparency at the council. But its real aim is
clearly to muck up the workings of the council." Stephen J. Lubben, A Legislative Assault
on the FinancialStability Oversight Council, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 10, 2014, 2:18

PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/a-legislative-assault-on-the-financial-stabilityoversight-council/?_r-1 [http://perma.cc/68HU-9HA2].
275 S. Res. 107, 114th Cong. § 1 (2015).
27 6
277

Id.

§ 2.

Id. § 2(a)(8)(B).
27 8
Id § 2(b).
279
Id § 3.
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B. Problems with the FSOC's Mandate
The preceding Part explored why the FSOC, as a committee of regulators
dominated by the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury, is not
optimally structured to address threats to financial stability. As this Part will
explore, the FSOC's statutory financial stability mandate is also less than
ideal.
The FSOC's mandate is set out in section 112(a)(1) of Dodd-Frank, and
reads as follows:
The purposes of the Council are(A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that
could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing
activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank
financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services
marketplace;
(B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part
of shareholders, creditors, and cohnterparties of such companies that the
Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and
(C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States
financial system. 280
The most obvious problem with this mandate is the inclusion of section
112(a)(1)(B), which seems to be at cross-purposes with the rest of the
mandate. Although one of the stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank legislation is
to end expectations of emergency governmental support for the financial
industry, the general consensus is that these expectations of intervention-and
28 1 While it is
the moral hazard they create-persist post-Dodd-Frank.
preferable to proactively address potential financial stability concerns,
282
emergency measures may well be required if such proactive regulation fails.
As such, well-designed ex post safety nets should be formalized in advance to
allow the FSOC to carry out its mandated purpose in section 112(a)(1)(C): to
"[r]espond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial
system." 283 The ban in section 112(a)(1)(B) on formalizing any kind of safety
net in advance will only ensure that if intervention does become necessary

280 Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
281 See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 64, at 207; Cheryl D. Block, Measuring
the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 149, 224 (2010); Levitin, supra

note 81, at 513.
282 See supra text accompanying note 98. For a thoughtful exploration of structuring
such ex post responses, see Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 102-22.
283 Dodd-Frank Act § 1 12(a)(1)(C).
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(and if a crisis is large enough, there will most likely be sufficient political
pressure to intervene), it will be adhoc in nature. 284
A more fundamental (but less obvious) problem with the FSOC's mandate
is the lack of clarity regarding the concepts of "financial stability" and
"stability of the United States financial system." These concepts are clearly
central to subsections 112(a)(1)(A) and (C), 285 but Dodd-Frank does not
provide any definition of "financial stability." I have argued elsewhere that
financial stability means both the absence of financial crisis and the financial
system's smooth functioning and ability to absorb (rather than amplify) shocks
such as tail-risks, 286 and the FSOC seems to accept this approach. In its 2011
Annual Report, the FSOC stated that "[a] stable financial system should not be
the source of, nor amplify the impact of, shocks." 28 7 However, as this Part will
explore, an ad hoc description buried in the FSOC's annual report does not
carry sufficient weight to focus regulatory attention on financial stability
issues in boom times. Furthermore, this informal description does not address
the normative question of why financial stability should be a policy goal in the
first place.
If financial instability only affected the profitability and solvency of
financial institutions themselves, then there would be no need for financial
stability regulation, nor to intervene when financial institutions or markets
failed.28 8 Unfortunately, because of "the close linkages between financial
stability and the health of the real economy," 2 89 "a distinguishing feature
of ... financial instability is that innocent bystanders get hurt." 290 As such, the
FSOC's mandate should reflect that the financial system is a means to an end
(i.e., it exists to facilitate payments and the distribution of capital, as well as to
manage risk, so that the economy beyond the financial system can grow),
rather than an end in itself. However, the text of Dodd-Frank does not clearly
2 84

1d. § 112(a)(1)(B).
d. § 112(a)(1)(A), (C).
286 Allen, supra note 53, at 943-44.
2 87
See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at 3. It should be noted that the FSOC is
sometimes inconsistent in its approach to "financial stability." In the FSOC's rules
implementing section 113 of Dodd-Frank with respect to the supervision and regulation of
non-bank financial companies, the FSOC stated that it "will consider a 'threat to the
financial stability of the United States' to exist if there would be an impairment of financial
intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be sufficiently severe to inflict
significant damage on the broader economy." 12 C.F.R. § 1310.23 (2013). Admittedly, this
definition applies only in a particular context (i.e., when determining whether non-bank
financial companies should be subjected to heightened prudential regulation), but it is
inconsistent with the FSOC's general approach articulated in its Annual Report because
this latter definition focuses exclusively on the absence of crisis, and does not incorporate
concepts of resilience or robustness. See FSOC REPORT, supranote 217, at ii-iii.
2 88
As the FSOC noted in its 2011 Annual Report, it is concerned with "the stability of
the financial system as a whole, as opposed to the risk facing individual financial
institutions or market participants." See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at 132.
289 Crockett, supranote 81, at 8.
290 Allen & Wood, supra note 18, at 160.
2 85
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convey this message. 29 1 In particular, because the FSOC's statutory mandate
expressly references financial institutions and the financial system without
mentioning externalities, the broader economy, or macroeconomic growth, it
could be read as implying that the FSOC should concern itself with the
financial sector qua financial sector, rather than the consequences of financial
system failure for society at large.
To be clear, there is nothing in the FSOC's mandate that expressly
prevents it from approaching financial stability as a means to promoting
broader economic prosperity. The problem is that there is nothing in the
FSOC's mandate that requires it to take this approach to financial stability
either. Regulators often lack public backing for their endeavors to promote
public goods like financial stability, 292 and without a constant statutory
reminder of what financial stability really is and whom it concerns, the goal of
financial stability can lose salience and legitimacy in times when the financial
system seems to be functioning normally. 293 Furthermore, as Dodd-Frank is
currently worded, there would be no statutory grounds for holding the FSOC
accountable if it follows the path of least resistance and ignores externalities,
focusing instead on the financial sector as an end in itself. Given that many
financial regulators have a dubious pre-Crisis track record of prioritizing
industry profitability (in the guise of efficiency) over broader public welfare
concerns, 294 it seems particularly remiss that the FSOC's statutory mandate
does not emphasize the importance of avoiding the externalities of financial
instability that affect those beyond financial institutions (and beyond their
shareholders, creditors and counterparties).
Instead, there are several legislative directions in Dodd-Frank that the
FSOC focus on efficiency and market discipline, 295 which could prove
particularly useful to industry participants seeking to challenge financial
stability regulation. Judicial review is intended to ensure that the FSOC's
actions accord with its statutory mandate and powers, 296 but in the absence of
291 Dodd-Frank has been criticized for failing to "articulate the principle for balancing
the public interest in preserving financial stability and limiting systemic risk against the
private interests of financial market participants in pursuing economic gain." Saule T.
Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Towards Tripartism in Financial
Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 634 (2012).
292
Evan J. Criddle, FiduciaryAdministration: Rethinking PopularRepresentation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 473 (2010); Short, supra note 83, at 680.
29 3
Brett McDonnell, Dampening FinancialRegulatory Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1597,
1605 (2013).
29 4
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1328-59 (2013).
295For example, section 112(a)(2)(N) of Dodd-Frank directs the FSOC to annually
report to and testify before Congress regarding "recommendations (I) to enhance the
integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of United States financial markets; (II)
to promote market discipline; and (III) to maintain investor confidence." Dodd-Frank Act
12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
§ 112(a)(2)(N),
296
Criddle, supra note 292, at 483-84.
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a mandate that makes it clear that the ultimate purpose of financial stability
regulation is to protect the broader economy, the courts (particularly the D.C.
Circuit) may treat the financial system as an end in itself, and assess the
FSOC's actions from a more efficiency-oriented perspective that focuses on
the costs that financial stability regulation imposes on the financial industry.297

It is very difficult for financial stability regulation to survive an "arbitrary and
capricious" review that is based on notions of efficiency and assessed by virtue
of quantified cost-benefit analysis, 2 98 and so the absence of a fulsome
financial stability mandate gives opponents of financial stability regulation an
upper hand in such litigation. Importantly, even the fear of such aggressive
judicial review can be counterproductive in the context of financial stability
regulation, to the extent that it encourages the FSOC to make timid
recommendations that are less likely to be overturned by the courts, but more
likely to unnecessarily complicate the financial system. 2 99

Finally, there are practical difficulties that could result from Dodd-Frank's
lack of clarity regarding "financial stability" and the FSOC's mandate. For
example, Dodd-Frank tethered together different permutations and
combinations of financial regulatory agencies by requiring them to make joint
rulemakings, and to coordinate on the supervision and enforcement of those
rules.30 0 This type of agency coordination is made more difficult if the
agencies have different understandings of what the legislation is trying to
achieve. In addition, the FSOC's currently articulated approach to financial
stability-which emphasizes the ability of the financial system to absorb
shocks as well as the absence of crisis-is inconsistent with the ad hoc
approach recently articulated by the OFR, which uses the more limited
"absence of crisis" conception of stability. 30 1 Given that the OFR provides the
FSOC with data regarding financial stability issues, it is easy to see that
inconsistent informal approaches could cause problems with regard to the

297

See Allen, supra note 31, at 176-77.
298See supra text accompanying notes 144-49. For a discussion of how the
professionalism and expertise of administrative agencies makes them worthy of, and
legitimizes, deference, see Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 463, 486--91
(2012).
2 99

C. F. LARRY HEIMANN,

ACCEPTABLE RISKS:

POLITICS, POLICY, AND RISKY

TECHNOLOGIES 18 (1998); Allen, supra note 31, at 186-87.
300 Some notable examples include the multi-agency rulemaking made pursuant to
section 619 of Dodd-Frank (the so-called "Volcker Rule"), and definitional rules relating
to swaps made jointly by the SEC and CFTC pursuant to sections 112(a)(8), (d)(1), and
712(d)(2)(B), (C) of Dodd-Frank.
301 The OFR has described financial stability as: "The condition in which the financial
system is sufficiently functioning to provide its basic tasks for the economy even under
stress." OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 133 (2012), http://financial

research.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-fmancial-research-annual-report-2012.pdf
perma.cc/QG2K-BQ2W].
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overall assessment of risks to financial stability. 302 A more fulsome legislative
description of "financial stability" would generate more clarity and
consistency in financial stability regulation.
V. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

The previous Part identified a number of features of the FSOC and its
mandate that are likely to impair the FSOC's ability to promote financial
stability. Given the importance of financial stability to society, this Part will
consider potential reforms to improve the efficacy of financial stability
regulation. While the political economy of financial stability regulation will
remain (at least to some extent) a perennial problem, "buffers can be put in
place to reduce unwarranted political pressure that can harm the public
interest." 30 3 To this end, Part V.A argues for the abandonment of the FSOC
and the creation of a stand-alone prudential regulator, with a sizable staff and
budget, to address financial stability. This would be the "Cadillac" reform
option, but there is clearly no political support for this type of radical reform at
present. Part V.A. is thus best thought of as a thought experiment, which might
inform reform efforts after the next- crisis. Part V.B, on the other hand,
explores a number of reforms that work within the existing U.S. financial
regulatory framework. Again, it is unlikely that there is sufficient political will
to implement any of these at present, but these proposals stand a stronger
chance of being implemented as responses to future crises.
A. A Stand-Alone PrudentialRegulator
The United States' bewildering array of financial regulatory agencies is
more a product of accident than of any conscious design. 30 4 Although some
have argued that the existing fragmented architecture has some benefits (in
terms of creating competition amongst regulators, resulting in more
specialized and efficient regulatory agencies), 30 5 the predominant consensus is
that the current structure makes little sense. 306 As Part IV.A.iii explored,
numerous coordination problems arise as a result of the division of financial
stability regulation functions amongst these different regulatory agencies.
302 Dodd-Frank Act § 153(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5343 (2012).
303
Barkow, supra note 243, at 79.
304 "The current regulatory structure for financial institutions in the United States
developed in a piecemeal fashion over time, often in response to various financial and
economic conditions existing in the past." THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 143 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter BUSH

BLUEPRINT], http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BQY7-T7HA].
30 5
30 6

CARNELL ET AL., supranote 77, at 65.

Id. at 63-64; John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The
Significance of OrganizationalStructure in Financialand Securities Regulation, 50 Bus.
LAW. 447, 481-82 (1995).
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However, in the wake of the Financial Crisis, there was no real attempt to
consolidate responsibility for financial stability issues into a single regulatory
body. 3 07 Thus, for context regarding how a consolidated financial regulator
might address financial stability issues, we need to look abroad. This Part will
consider both the British and the Australian experiences with consolidated
financial regulators, and the lessons they suggest for regulatory reform in the
United States.
The Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 consolidated supervision
of the entire British financial industry in the Financial Services Authority (the
FSA). 308 As such, the FSA had responsibility for prudential stability concerns
as well as for market conduct issues. Although consolidating all financial
regulators into one might seem superficially appealing, 309 in retrospect, it is
clear that financial stability concerns were largely trumped by other regulatory
objectives in the pre-Crisis FSA. 3 10 The Turner Review, released in the wake
of the Financial Crisis, indicated that the FSA favored efficiency over stability
as a regulatory philosophy, and that that preference manifested itself in a
laissez-faire, market discipline-based approach that often eschewed the
interventionist regulation necessary as a prudential supervisor. 311 There is a
risk, then, that if the U.S. were to create a single financial regulator, "one type
of regulation would come to dominate within [that] single regulator" 312 and
given that financial stability regulation fails to attract public attention in boom
times, it is the type of regulation most likely to fall by the wayside. 3 13 As
Senator Collins pointed out in the debates regarding Dodd-Frank, "the
experience in the United Kingdom demonstrates, [the consolidation of
regulatory agencies into one] would be no guarantee that our Nation's
economy would be shielded from systemic risk." 3 14 The United Kingdom's
experience with the FSA cautions against the creation of a monolithic financial
regulator in the United States; in fact, the FSA's track record was so poor that
307 Although the Bush Blueprint indicated that the twin peaks approach
was the
optimal one, it was never pursued. BUSH BLUEPRINT, supra note 304, at 143. Obama's
original proposal instead fixed on the notion of creating a council of regulators to deal with
systemic risk. OBAMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3. Susan Collins, a Republican who
supported financial reform, agreed that a council of regulators was the best approach: "To
my mind, the President's decision to rely on a council model makes his proposal far more
practical and effective than alternatives which would have required the restructuring of
most or all of the financial agencies that currently oversee the financial system." 111
CONG. REc. S6,682 (daily ed. June 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. Collins) [hereinafter
Collins Statement].
308 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, §§ 1-2 (UK).
309For a discussion of the arguments advanced in support of the creation
of the FSA
(including efficiency and economies of scale), see Taylor, supra note 80, at 73-78.
3 10
THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 136, at 87.
3 11 Id.

312 Taylor, supra note 80, at 82.
3 13
Id. at 81.
3 14
Collins Statement, supra note 307, at S6,682.
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it was entirely restructured by the United Kingdom's Financial Services Act of
2012.315

Instead, many have concluded that the so-called "twin peaks" model is
3 16
best calculated to ensure a regulatory focus on financial stability issues. The
twin peaks model involves the creation of two distinct regulatory bodies: one
with responsibility for prudential regulation of all financial institutions, and
the other with responsibility for market conduct regulation (in each case,
without regard for the legal form of the financial institutions being regulated,
thus limiting the potential for regulatory arbitrage).3 17 Because the prudential
regulatory body is not distracted by any primary responsibility for efficiency
or other market conduct issues, it is structured in a way that maximizes the
3 18
likelihood that it will maintain a long-term focus on financial stability.
Furthermore, a prudential agency that regulates a broad range of activities and
firms (rather than splitting jurisdiction along the lines of banking, securities,
derivatives, and insurance-as is currently the case in the United States) might
be less susceptible to capture, because it is less beholden to the worldview of
any one segment of the financial industry. 3 19
A form of the twin peaks model was implemented in the United Kingdom
in 2013, when two bodies (the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the
Financial Conduct Authority) replaced the FSA. 3 20 These agencies are too new
to offer much guidance to the United States at present. However, the twin
peaks model has a much longer history in Australia, which adopted the model
in 1998 with the creation of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA) 32 1 and the restructuring of the Australian Securities & Investments

3 15

Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, § 6 (UK).
316The Bush Blueprint concluded that "The optimal objectives-based regulatory
structure... somewhat resembles the model adopted in Australia." BUSH BLUEPRINT,
supra note 304, at 143. In addition, a report by the Group of 30 noted that: "There is a
growing interest in and support for 'regulation by objective' of the Twin Peaks Approach
to supervision." GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION:
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 14 (2008) [hereinafter G30

REPORT], http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%2OStructure%200f%2OFinancial%
Supervision.pdf [http://perma.cc/CW8C-CCVR].
317 Taylor, supra note 80, at 78.
318
319

2

0

Id. at 81.

Barkow, supra note 243, at 50; Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of the Handling
of the FinancialCrisis in the United States, the UnitedKingdom and Australia, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 509, 563 (2010).
320
Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, §§ 2, 6 (UK).
321 "[APRA] is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial services industry. It
oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance
companies, life insurance, private health insurance, friendly societies, and most of the
superannuation industry.... It was established on 1 July 1998." About APRA, AusTL.
PRUDENTIAL REG. AUTHORITY, http://apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Default.aspx [http://
perma.cc/7MUU-92DJ].
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Commission (ASIC). 322 APRA has had a good track record with regard to
financial stability since that time: no Australian banks suffered losses, nor did
Australia drop into recession, as a result of the Financial Crisis. 323 Of course,
there were other mitigating factors that help explain why Australia emerged
from the Financial Crisis relatively unscathed, 324 and it is impossible to
disentangle the impact of Australia's regulatory structure from these other
mitigating factors. Nonetheless, there are a number of APRA's features that
seem calculated to produce an agency conducive to financial stability
regulation. The remainder of this Part will explore how these features could be
replicated (and supplemented) in the United States to create a stand-alone
prudential regulatory agency that is most likely to take the proactive, longterm regulatory approach so necessary to financial stability regulation.
To implement the twin peaks approach in the United States, the FSOC,

OCC, FDIC, SEC, CFTC, CFPB, and NCUA would all be abolished. In their

place would be created two new agencies-a market conduct and consumer
protection regulator (similar to Australia's ASIC), and a stand-alone prudential
regulator (similar to Australia's APRA). This Article is concerned primarily
with financial stability and thus focuses only on the design
of the latter agency,
which would be a federal agency with prudential authority over all institutions
carrying out financial activities (including insurance activities), no matter what
the form of the legal entity carrying out those activities. 325
Implementing the twin peaks model in the United States should also entail
denuding the Federal Reserve of its function as a bank supervisor and of its
authority under Dodd-Frank to supervise SIFIs 326 (the Australian central
bank-the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)--does not actively supervise
financial institutions). 327 This would diminish Federal Reserve dominance in
financial stability matters, potentially making regulation in the United States
less bank-centric. The Federal Reserve would remain responsible for monetary
policy, and would also retain its lender-of-last-resort function, 328 but it would
fulfill such functions with information provided by the newly created
322

"In 1998 the organisation took on responsibility for
consumer protection in
superannuation, insurance and deposit taking and was renamed the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission." How We Operate, AUSTL. SEC.
& INV. COMM'N,
http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/how-we-operate/ [http://perma.cc/XU7Q-553N]
(last updated May 15, 2015).
323 Brown, supra note 319, at 519,
521, 550.
324 For a fulsome exploration of the many factors
that influenced Australia's superior
performance during the Financial Crisis, see Jennifer G. Hill, Why Did Australia Fare So

Well in the Global FinancialCrisis?, in THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRisis 203, 244 n.300 (Eilis Ferran et al. eds., 2012).

Such a restructuring could limit opportunities for
institutional regulatory arbitrage,
and the growth of the shadow banking industry.
326
Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
327
G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 40.
328For a summary of the Federal Reserve's current
functions, see CARNELL ET AL.,
supra note 77, at 61.
325
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prudential regulator, rather than gathering such information itself in the course
of its supervision. While there are many who argue strenuously that "the
to the
information acquired in the capacity of .. . supervisor [is] essential
329 given that
function"
lender-of-last-resort
the
central bank performing
just within the
systemic risks can arise all over the financial system (and not330
it is naYve to
banks and SIFIs that the Federal Reserve currently regulates),
think that the Federal Reserve can gather all the information it needs to
discharge its lender-of-last-resort functions through its own supervisory
function. Instead, like the RBA in Australia, the Federal Reserve should rely
on Memoranda of Understanding and close cooperation with the prudential
regulatory agency (and others) to ensure that it has the necessary information
33 1
to determine when it should exercise its lender-of-last-resort function.
Following the restructuring proposed in this Part, the Secretary of the
Treasury would no longer have an official role within the agency dedicated to
financial stability. This would alleviate the concerns previously raised about
332
the Secretary of the Treasury politicizing financial stability regulation.
Furthermore, the OFR would be removed from the Treasury (where it
currently resides) and relocated within the new stand-alone prudential agency.
In such context, the OFR may be able to achieve its promise as a "regulatory
contrarian." 333 Insulated from the more politicized Treasury, it would
presumably have more freedom to raise unpopular arguments and issues in a
334 In addition,
way that disrupts groupthink about where systemic risks lie.
Barkow has noted that the ability of an agency to generate and disseminate
335 an effective OFR could
information is key to retaining public support:
release information in a way that assists in maintaining a positive public
profile for financial stability regulation and the new prudential agency.
In terms of structuring the new prudential agency itself, there are a number
members
of APRA's features that should be emulated. For example, APRA's
336 and can
are appointed by the executive rather than being elected officials
33 7 To ensure the independence
only be terminated for certain specified causes.
of a stand-alone United States prudential regulator, these features should be
329 Taylor, supra note 80, at 84; see also G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 40.
3 30
See supra text accompanying notes 75-80. Regarding the potential for smaller
financial institutions to destabilize the financial system, see Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 17.
331 There is a Memorandum of Understanding between APRA and the RBA regarding
cooperation and coordination in instances involving threats to the financial system's
stability. G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 195.
3 32
See supra Part IV.A.2.
3 33
McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 1670.
334Id. at 1647-48.
335
Barkow, supra note 243, at 59.
336
See Gadinis, supra note 176, at 336. The members of APRA are appointed by the
Australian Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Treasurer. G30 REPORT,
supranote 316, at 191.
337 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 s 25(2) (Austl.).
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replicated. 33 8 This would ensure that the stand-alone regulator would be more
apolitical than the current FSOC, which is rendered susceptible to the vagaries
of political economy by the prominence of the Secretary of the Treasury
within the council. 339 Such an approach should not be considered unusual or
controversial; at present, the heads of most of the existing financial regulatory
agencies in the United States are appointed, and can only be removed for
cause. 34 0 What is likely to be controversial is whether the new agency should
be headed by a single director or a multi-member commission; this was a
matter of heated debate in the context of the founding of the CFPB. 34 1 There
are, of course, benefits and drawbacks to both approaches. Multi-member
commissions can be viewed as promoting collegiality and deal making, or
decried as promoting inaction and wasteful horse-trading. 34 2 While a single
director is more likely to be efficient and accountable than a group of
commissioners, he or she brings only one perspective to the position, and is
also potentially more susceptible to capture. 34 3
On balance, this Article recommends following APRA, 344 and
implementing a multi-member commission for the new agency. 345 One of the
338 In the United States, "the defining hallmark of an
independent agency is that it is
headed by someone who cannot be removed at will by the President but instead can be
removed only for good cause." Barkow, supra note 243, at 16.
3 39
See supra Part IV.A.2.
34 0
Barkow, supra note 243, at 29.
341 See, e.g., Ben Protess, Warren and Republicans Spar
Over Bureau's Power, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 24, 2011, 3:11 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/
warren-and-g-o-p-lawmakers-spar-over-bureaus-power/?
1r-[http://perma.cc/VV5X-H9F6].
342
Levitin Testimony, supra note 264, at 9-10.
343 Barkow, supranote 243, at 37-38.
344
APRA is headed by no more than five and no less than three members.
Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 s 16(1) (Austl.).
345 Instituting a diversified multi-member commission
seems important from a
legitimacy perspective: given the sweeping powers that the new agency would wield,
it
would be unwise to concentrate that power in the hands of one person
or one party (also,
one person or party is more easily captured by industry than a diversified multi-member
commission). While it has been argued that single directors have more of a bias towards
action than do multi-member commissions, Levitin Testimony, supra note 264, at 10, that
would seemingly depend on the ideology of the director in question. A single director that
is opposed to action is likely to be more passive than a multi-member commission. A
multi-member commission is less likely to be efficient than an agency with a single
director, id. at 9-10, but given that this Article's proposal would result in a reduction of the
number of federal financial regulatory agencies from eight to two, even with a multimember commission, it is still a net positive from an efficiency perspective (a move to a
single agency would also cut down on wasteful turf battles between existing financial
regulatory agencies). The biggest concern in terms of instituting a multi-member
commission to govern the new prudential regulatory agency is the risk of shirking-it is
harder to hold multi-member commissions accountable than single directors. Id. However,
this trade-off seems worthwhile given that a multi-member commission best allows for the
broad range of perspectives necessary for effective financial stability regulation. Barkow,
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key arguments of this Article is that, when dealing with financial stability,
regulatory imagination and a broad-view perspective are vital. These are more
likely to be achieved with multiple commissioners with heterogeneous
346 Ideally, the new agency would be
perspectives than with a single director.
structured so that each commissioner would represent a different area of
expertise: one member could be drawn from a pool of qualified persons with
banking expertise, another could be drawn from a pool with securities
expertise, another would have insurance expertise, another derivatives
expertise, and another experience with funds. There should also be sufficient
flexibility to include new areas of financial expertise as they evolve. The
commissioners should be somewhat balanced in terms of political party
of
affiliations, as research indicates that "a group composed solely 347
making."
decision
extreme
toward
ideologically like-minded people tends
Each of the commissioners should be required to testify before Congress on a
regular basis, so that no one commissioner dominates the new agency's
messaging, and in a similar vein, it would be helpful if the role of chairing the
commission and setting its agenda could rotate amongst the commissioners. If
the new agency were structured such that each year, a commissioner with a
different type of expertise would set.the agency's priorities, then that would
maximize the chance of different perspectives being heard in the long run.
Typically, multi-member commissions of independent agencies are
34 8 Thought should thus
appointed with "the advice and consent of the Senate."
be given as to which Senate committee would oversee the appointment
process, and indeed which committee should oversee the new agency in
general. Given the desire to break the bank-centric mentality that currently
informs financial stability regulation, it would be best if the new agency did
not operate under the aegis of the Senate Banking Committee. Instead, a
committee with a broader purview, such as the Finance Committee, should
oversee the new prudential regulatory agency. Preferably, a public-minded
subcommittee on financial stability would be established within the Finance
Committee for the purpose of overseeing financial stability and the new
agency, so that the agency's political overseers are less likely to focus solely
349
on appeasing financial industry interests.

supra note 243, at 37-38. For further discussion of these issues, see id. at 37-38, 53;
Testimony, supra note 264, at 10-11.
Levitin
346
Marisam notes that groupthink can be disrupted by "staff and officials with
significantly different professional backgrounds and regulatory experiences." Marisam,
supra note 259, at 214. Barkow notes that a single director "means less deliberation and
debate." Barkow, supra note 243, at 37.
34 7
Barkow, supra note 243, at 40.
348 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3 49
For a discussion of the importance of locating an agency "within the jurisdiction of
an oversight committee that is more likely to favor a broad public interest than industry
interests," see Barkow, supra note 243, at 62.
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The leadership structure of the new agency is important, but the new
agency's method of funding will also be key to ensuring its focus on the public
interest. The new agency would require a robust staff (including the OFR) to
discharge its functions, and reliance on either the President or Congress for
funding to support that staff would compromise the independence of the
prudential regulator.3 50 Instead, funding should be levied from industry fees
(APRA is similarly funded). 3 5 1 Admittedly, past experience has shown that
reliance on industry fees made regulators like the OCC and the OTS more
susceptible to industry capture. 3 52 However, the OCC and OTS were
competing to implement ever-laxer regulation in order to attract institutions to
charter with them (and thus expand their influence and funding pools)resulting in pervasive capture and a deregulatory "race to the bottom." 353 If a
new prudential regulatory agency were created, financial institutions would
have no choice as to whether they would be regulated by it, and so there would
be no competition for the industry's favor in order to attract funding.
Independence from elected officials could thus be bolstered without increasing
dependence on the financial industry.
Finally, the statutory mandate of the new agency is also important. APRA
is directed "to balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency,
competition, contestability and competitive neutrality and, in balancing these
objectives, is to promote financial system stability in Australia." 354 While this
mandate does include a statutory direction to consider efficiency concerns,
APRA is directed to prioritize financial stability concerns. Granting the United
States prudential regulator a similar paramount financial stability mandate can
assist in training regulatory focus on financial stability (even in normal and
boom times), and in fostering a public-focused regulatory identity. As Kwak
has noted, "[s]omeone who identifies as an economically sophisticated steward
of efficient financial markets will adopt different policy positions from
someone who identifies as a defender of the 'little guy."' 355 A statutory charge

to protect the public from the fallout from financial instability would thus
frame the agency's decision-making in a different light. The example of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is instructive here 35 6: the EPA is
often cited as an administrative agency that identifies primarily with the

35 0

Id. at 44.
351 "APRA is largely financed by fees imposed on the
financial sector entities it
supervises as determined and collected by the Australian government-as a levy on
supervised entities." G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 193.
352
Barkow, supra note 243, at 44-45 n.159.
353
Wilmarth, supra note 294, at 1390-92.
354 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 s 8(2)
(Austl.).
3 55
See Kwak, supra note 85, at 83.
356 "The mission of [the] EPA is to protect human health
and the environment." About

EPA:

Our

Mission

and

What

We

Do,

U.S.

ENVTL.

PROTECTION

AGENCY,

http://www2 .epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [http://perma.cc/9SVK-QXKD].
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interests of the public, 3 57 and is thus less susceptible to cognitive capture by its
3 58 In a similar vein,
regulated industries on issues like clean air regulation.
Wilmarth has argued that, when compared with other banking regulators, the
359
FDIC has exhibited fewer signs of capture, partially because of the FDIC's
"clearly defined mission" as the protector of the little guys (depositors) and of
3 60
a public good (the Deposit Insurance Fund).
Of course, if we assume that regulators are motivated entirely by selfinterest, then a financial stability mandate would make little difference to how
regulators carry out their jobs, (at least in normal times, when the costs of
financial instability are not particularly salient to the public at large, and there
36
is thus little reputational cost to abandoning stability efforts). 1 Purely selfinterested regulators, for example, might purposefully defer to industry
interests in drafting and enforcing regulations in order to avoid conflict with
the industry (i.e., prefer their own self-interest in an "easy life"), or to procure
362 However, we should be careful about how
an industry job in the future.
much credence is given to this assumption about self-interest. There is
empirical research that indicates that regulatory agencies will often actively
36 3
prefer the longer term public interest to their own short-term self-interest.
To the extent that regulators genuinely identify with the benefits of long-term
financial stability, taking actions that instead prioritize the short-term

357

Kwak, supra note 85, at 84-85.
3581For a discussion of the EPA's decision to tighten restrictions on ozone and
particulate matter in the face of extremely strong industry opposition, see Steven P. Croley,
Public InterestedRegulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 55-66 (2000).
359 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. wrote:
During the period leading up to the financial crisis, the FDIC (i) generally took a
tougher position against subprime mortgage lending, and (ii) "fought hard to maintain
tougher capital rules for U.S. banks (including leverage capital requirements) during
international negotiations over the Basel II capital accord." The FDIC also pushed the
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision to adopt stronger capital standards-including
a leverage requirement-in the post-crisis Basel III accord, although Basel III did not
and
go far enough. The FDIC prevailed (over the opposition of New York Fed
Treasury officials) in deciding that WaMu's bondholders would not be bailed out
when WaMu failed in September 2008. The FDIC achieved partial success-again
despite the contrary views of Fed and OCC officials-when it pressured the largest
banks to satisfy tougher capital-raising requirements in order to exit the TARP capital
assistance program.

Wilmarth, supra note 294, at 1405 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The FinancialServices Industry's Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial
ProtectionBureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 881, 947-48 (2012)).
360Id. at 1404.
361 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 97 n.174; Short, supra note 83, at 652.
362
Omarova, supra note 291, at 630.
363 See Bradley, supra note 166, at 778.
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profitability of the financial industry will cause them troubling cognitive
dissonance. 364
Overall, then, there is much to be gained from creating a stand-alone
prudential regulatory agency in the United States. The mere act of shaking up
the existing financial regulatory structure, where many of the agencies have
demonstrated a strong culture of capture, 365 could have salutary effects.
However, the United States has proven consistently stubborn about
rationalizing its financial regulatory architecture. 366 Recognizing that such
rationalization may be a bridge too far, the next section will therefore consider
the possibility of leaving the United States' existing financial regulatory
structure largely intact, but making changes (some limited, some more drastic)
to improve regulatory focus on financial stability.
B. Working Within the Existing Regulatory Framework
There are a number of changes to Dodd-Frank that would help legitimize
and increase the salience of the FSOC's efforts to promote financial stability.
For example, section 112(a)(1)(B) would ideally be repealed, allowing the
FSOC to work on formalizing, in advance, ex post safety nets designed to
mitigate future crises. Most importantly, though, financial stability should be
defined, in order to authorize the exercise of regulatory discretion in a way that
prioritizes the interests of society as a whole in financial stability. To this end,
Dodd-Frank should be amended to include something akin to the following
definition of financial stability:
The term "financial stability" shall mean a state of affairs wherein
(i) financial institutions and markets are able to facilitate capital
intermediation, risk management, and payment services in a way that enables
sustainable economic growth; (ii) there is no disruption to the ability of
financial institutions or markets to carry out such functions that might cause
harm to persons (wherever they may be resident) who are not customers or
counterparties of those financial institutions, nor participants in those
financial markets; and (iii) financial institutions and markets are able to
withstand economic shocks (such as the failure of other markets and
institutions, or a chain of significant loses at financial institutions) so that (x)
there will be no disruption to the performance of the functions set forth in (i)
and (y) no harm will be caused to the persons set forth in (ii). 367

Admittedly, a mandate to pursue financial stability, defined as per this
Part, would not be overly prescriptive. This may be dissatisfying for some,
who might seek more precise direction for the FSOC as to how to proceed in
364

Kwak, supra note 85, at 94.
365 Barkow, supranote 243, at 75.
366 Coffee, supra note 306, at 447-48; see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 77,
at 64.
367 Allen, supra note 53, at 932.
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achieving financial stability 368-perhaps by using a quantitative metric that
indicates precisely when the financial system is and is not stable, and when
intervention is and is not required. However, there are perils inherent in
hewing too closely to mandates that are simple to follow, but do not accurately
3 69 In reality, a need for
reflect the real risks inherent in the financial system.
regulatory discretion is inevitable when dealing with complex subject
matter. 370 This Part's proposed definition of financial stability seeks to strike a
balance such that the financial stability mandate is "neither excessively selfconfident about what we know about financial stability so as to produce
unfortunate unintended consequences, nor excessively tentative so as to fail to
371
take steps to counter the very real risks that do exist."
Turning from the FSOC's mandate to its structure, the key purpose of any
structural reform should be to increase the participation, commitment and
accountability of the FSOC's voting members (particularly those other than
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury) with respect to financial stability
matters. There are a number of incremental reforms that could assist in
focusing agencies on financial stability issues. For example, section 112(b) of
Dodd-Frank currently requires the FSOC's voting members to submit signed
statements certifying their belief that the FSOC, the government, and the
private sector "are taking all reasonable steps to ensure financial stability and
372 While
to mitigate systemic risk that would negatively affect the economy."
on its face it might seem that this certification would hold the voting members
accountable for financial stability issues, the phrasing of the certification is
important-it does not require a voting member to certify that their agency,
independently, is taking steps to promote financial stability. Pursuant to
section 112(b), the voting member is merely stating his or her belief as to the
actions of the FSOC, over which he or she has no controlling influence. Here,
it would be beneficial to follow the lead of section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act37 3 and alter the certification such that it requires the voting member to
take, at least symbolically, personal responsibility for their agency's
commitment to financial stability matters. The signed statement should be
required to refer to satisfaction with the agency's own efforts to promote
368 The purported precision of the efficiency mandate, as measured by cost-benefit
analysis, is part of its appeal. See Allen, supra note 31, at 203.
369 For a discussion of the limiting potential of quantitative models, see Erik F.
Gerding, Code, Crash and Open Source: The Outsourcing of FinancialRegulation to Risk
Models and the GlobalFinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 170-75 (2009).
370 In our complex society, "the brute fact [is] that the law necessarily entrusts policymaking discretion to administrative agencies." Criddle, supra note 292, at 491.
371 Tarullo, supra note 180, at 27.
372 Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
373 Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires CEOs and CFOs to personally certify
financial reports, in an attempt to "ensur[e] personal responsibility" for the acts of the
corporation controlled by the CEO and CFO, at least at a symbolic level. Lisa M. Fairfax,
Form over Substance: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2002).
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financial stability, as well as the efforts of the FSOC, the government, and the
private sector.
The Congressional hearing required by section 112(a)(2)(N) of DoddFrank could be adapted to a similar end. 374 That section requires the Treasury
Secretary, on behalf of the FSOC, to testify before Congress each year
regarding "potential emerging threats to the financial stability of the United
States." 375 This requirement could be expanded such that all of the FSOC's
voting members (and not just the Treasury Secretary) are required to appear
together before Congress at this annual hearing, and field questions regarding
financial stability. In doing so, the FSOC's voting members would not only
maintain the salience of financial stability issues for themselves, they would
also play an educative role, 376 informing the legislature and the public at large
about risks arising in the non-bank corners of the financial system.
Thus far, this Part has discussed reforms that merely tinker around the
edges of Dodd-Frank. While helpful, these are limited in their ability to
address the key problem that arises when an express financial stability
mandate is given to a council of regulatory agency leaders, but not to the
agencies themselves: if the agencies are not concerned with financial stability
issues, then a council of their leaders is unlikely to be effective in pursuing
financial stability. 377 A more radical approach would be to give all of the

federal financial regulatory agencies express statutory mandates to pursue
financial stability. The arguments for giving each federal financial agency a
financial stability mandate largely echo arguments that have already been
made in favor of a fulsome financial stability mandate for the FSOC, and for
an APRA-style prudential regulator. For example, conferring a statutory
financial stability mandate on each of the agencies (especially when coupled
with a requirement to regularly testify before Congress as to how the agency is
satisfying such mandate) could mitigate the political economy of financial
stability regulation by training regulatory attention on financial stability issues
even in normal and boom times, when the public is largely oblivious to such
issues. 378 The mandate could also permit the agencies to develop broader,
simpler, rules that are better calculated to promote stability than rules that deal
too granularly with the minutiae of financial activities-with less fear of
rebuke from the D.C. Circuit.379 Finally, the mandate could be instrumental in
374 Dodd-Frank Act § 1 12(a)(2)(N).
37 5
Id
37 6
Criddle, supra note 292, at 475. The dissemination of information that occurs as
part of that testimony can "help energize the public to overcome collective action problems
and rally behind the agency." Barkow, supra note 243, at 59.
37 7
The GAO noted from interviews with individual financial agencies their position
"that any effort to coordinate rulemakings assigned to specific agencies through FSOC
would need to be balanced against the statutory requirements of the independent agencies
involved." Clowers Statement, supra note 161, at 5.
378
See supra text accompanying notes 354-60.
379
See supra text accompanying notes 295-99.
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fostering public-focused regulatory identities, rendering financial regulators
3 80
less susceptible to lobbying and cognitive capture.
While the reforms discussed in this Part seek to work within the United
States' existing regulatory framework, there are two structural reforms that
would be required to make the FSOC a truly effective coordination
mechanism. First, the Treasury Secretary should be removed from his or her
position of prominence within the FSOC. Instead, the FSOC should be chaired
by an independent, separately funded Chairperson who is appointed by the
President, and can only be removed for cause. 38 1 (This was, in fact, the
approach that Senator Collins favored at the time Dodd-Frank was being
debated. She argued that the Treasury Secretary should not chair the FSOC,
and that the independence of the FSOC should be preserved by appointing a
Chairperson who would be unaffiliated with the Treasury, or any of the
FSOC's member agencies.) 382 Not only would such a reform reduce some of
the political pressures on the FSOC, the new independent FSOC chairperson
383
could also function as a type of regulatory contrarian. One criticism that has
been leveled at the FSOC is that it will not address failures of imagination
about financial stability and systemic risk "if the personnel in the [FSOC] are
384 However, if the
simply recycled regulators and central bankers."
Chairperson of the FSOC (together with his or her staff) were drawn from
outside the traditional pool of financial regulators, they could bring new
methodologies and philosophies to the task, which could help break regulatory
385
groupthink about where the risks to financial stability lie.
The second structural reform required is that insurance needs to be
regulated at the federal level. Insurance has traditionally been regulated by the
states, and although Dodd-Frank now requires the President to appoint to the
3 86 and also
FSOC an independent member with insurance expertise,
380 Jean-Charles Rochet, Policies to Stabilize Financial Markets, in FINANCIAL
STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 191, 192 (2009).

381 The process for selecting and appointing this Chairperson could be modeled on the
process currently used for selecting and appointing the independent member of the FSOC
with insurance expertise. Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (b)(1)(j), 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
382
During the Dodd-Frank debate, Senator Susan Collins commented:
While I am pleased the President has chosen the council of regulators model as well, I

differ with his proposal to have the Secretary of the Treasury serve as the head of the
council. Instead, I believe the council's chairman should be independent of any of the
regulatory agencies serving on the council and that it is important that that chairman

devote his or her full energies to that role and not have other important
responsibilities.
Collins Statement, supra note 307, at S6,682-,683.
383
McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 1647-48.
384 Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 203, at 838.
385
McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 1673.
386 Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (b)(1)(j).
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established a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury
Department, 3 87 state regulators still retain primacy in this area of the law.388
Unfortunately, state-level regulation is not particularly conducive to dealing
with systemic risks and financial instability, given that the negative
consequences of in-state activity are externalized throughout the country (and
internationally). 3 89 To ensure a focus on the systemic risks that the insurance
industry can create, a federal regulator is needed, 390 and a financial stability
mandate should be conferred on such regulator.
The FSOC could be an extremely useful coordination and communication
authority if it were working with a group of financial regulatory agencies that
were truly committed to addressing threats to financial stability in all of their
potentially different manifestations. Even if one or two member agencies were
to attempt to shirk their newly-created statutory responsibilities for financial
stability, the other member agencies-now charged with an express statutory
obligation to address financial instability that they must fulfill or be held
accountable for neglecting-would be more likely to exert the FSOC's power
under section 120 of Dodd-Frank to bring the shirking agencies into line.
Short of implementing such financial stability mandates, however, it is likely
that most of the FSOC's members will abdicate responsibility for financial
stability issues in normal and boom times, leaving (at most) only the Federal
Reserve to monitor and address perceived threats to financial stability.
To be clear, this Part's proposal to give all federal regulators a financial
stability mandate is inferior to the creation of an APRA-style prudential
regulator. Each of the existing federal financial agencies has a pre-existing
mandate over which the new financial stability mandate would be overlaid,
and just as with the FSA in the UK, it may be that the pre-existing mandates
will be prioritized over the new financial stability mandate. 39 1 Furthermore,
the jurisdictions of the existing regulators tend to be delineated by industry,
and focus on a particular type of industry makes the agency more susceptible
387

1d. § 502(a).

388 Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz stated:
The FIO has no regulatory authority over the insurance industry[, and has only a very
limited power to preempt state law when it determines those laws conflict with
international legal agreements]. Instead, the FIO's principal role is to serve as a
federal monitor of the insurance industry and state regulation and to "coordinate
Federal efforts and develop Federal policy on prudential aspects of international
insurance matters."
Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 76, at 1590 (footnote omitted) (quoting Dodd-Frank
Act § 313(c)(1)(E)).
389Id. at 1627.
390
Schwarcz and Schwarcz have therefore argued that the FIO should be given
expanded powers to regulate for systemic risk. Id. at 1634-39. Although the location of the
FIO within the politicized Treasury is grounds for some concern, this Article generally
supports the federalization of insurance regulation.
391 See supra text accompanying notes 309-13.
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392
to capture than a stand-alone regulator with sweeping jurisdiction would be.
Nonetheless, giving each financial regulator a statutory charge to monitor and
address threats to financial stability is preferable to the status quo, where the
federal financial regulatory agencies have (at best) implicit charges to consider
financial stability issues. 393

VI. CONCLUSION
Financial stability is a vital public good, and it is precisely when the
economy is booming that the foundations for financial stability must be laid
(for example, by restricting profitable but potentially destabilizing activities,
or by formalizing ex post safety nets in anticipation of future instability, or by
implementing restrictive countercyclical regulation in the face of warning
signs of impending instability). However, the FSOC, as a body with limited
resources and powers of its own, will be unable to aggressively pursue
financial stability without the committed assistance of its member agencies.
While the Federal Reserve does seem committed-at least at present-to
pursuing financial stability, it is suboptimal for the Federal Reserve (informed
as it is by its bank-centric perspective) to have a monopoly on financial
stability regulation. Instead, the other financial regulatory agencies, which
have information and expertise about disparate corners of the financial system,
should also be actively involved in promoting financial stability. However,
there is little incentive for them to do so, given that they have no express
mandate or statutory instructions to pursue financial stability, and as the
economy improves, any efforts to this end are likely to receive little public
support-and harsh criticism from the financial industry. Unless the financial
stability regulatory structure is altered to ensure that there is a substantive and
independent regulatory body (or bodies) committed to, and accountable for,
monitoring and addressing threats to financial stability, the United States will
remain unnecessarily exposed to future financial crises-which will harm
those outside of the financial system more than those within it.

392
39 3

Barkow, supra note 243, at 50.
See supra Part IV.A.3.

